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NOTE
ETHICAL AND PROCEDURAL IMPLICATIONS OF
"GHOSTWRITING" FOR PRO SE LITIGANTS:




Before the Law stands a doorkeeper. To this doorkeeper there
comes a man from the country and prays for admittance to the
Law.... [T]he doorkeeper laughs and says: "If you are so drawn to
it, just try to go in despite my veto. But take note: I am powerful.
And I am only the least of the doorkeepers. From hall to hall there
is one doorkeeper after another, each more powerful than the last.
The third doorkeeper is already so terrible that even I cannot bear
to look at him." These are difficulties the man from the country has
not expected; the Law, he thinks, should surely be accessible at all
times and to everyone, but as he now takes a closer look at the
doorkeeper in his fur coat, with his big sharp nose and long, thin,
black Tartar beard, he decides that it is better to wait until he gets
permission to enter. The doorkeeper gives him a stool and lets him
sit down at one side of the door. There he sits for days and years.'
An abstract legal right is worthless without a correlative right of
access to the judicial system to enforce it. Accordingly, the Supreme
Court has repeatedly identified reasonable access to the courts as a
fundamental constitutional right.2 Indeed, "[o]ne of the basic princi-
ples, one of the glories, of the American system of justice is that the
courthouse door is open to everyone-the humblest citizen, the indi-
gent, the convicted felon, the illegal alien."'3 In the civil context, how-
ever, the right to legal counsel does not accompany this fundamental
1. Franz Kafka, Before the Law, in The Complete Stories 3, 3 (villa Muir &
Edwin Muir trans., Schocken Books 1971).
2. Various decisions have grounded the constitutional right of access to the courts
in the Privileges and Immunities Clause, see Chambers v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co.,
207 U.S. 142, 147-48 (1907), the First Amendment right of petition, see California
Motor Transp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510-11 (1972), the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, see Boddie v. Connecticut, 401
U.S. 371,375 (1971), and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
see id at 385-86 (Douglas, J., concurring). See generally Jona Goldschmidt et al.,
Meeting the Challenge of Pro Se Litigation: A Report and Guidebook for Judges and
Court Managers 19-24 (1998) (discussing the legal foundation of the right of self-
representation).
3. NAACP v. Meese, 615 F. Supp. 200, 205-06 (D.D.C. 1985).
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right of access to the courts.4 Thus, low-income individuals who wish
to invoke their rights or settle their disputes in court must either fall
into the minuscule proportion of the population that qualifies for free
legal assistance or be forced to bring their own complaints and repre-
sent themselves without the benefit of counsel.5
The existence of a right to the courts without a correlative right to
legal assistance and advice has resulted in the drastic under-represen-
tation of low and moderate-income households in the civil justice sys-
tem.6 The most recent study of legal needs among these populations
found that low-income households' legal problems involved the judi-
cial system only twenty-nine percent of the time, and that no action of
any kind was taken thirty-eight percent of the time.7 For legal
problems of households defined as moderate-income, and thus cate-
gorically ineligible for most free legal services, the judicial system was
involved only thirty-nine percent of the time, and no action was taken
in twenty-six percent of cases.8 These figures demonstrate that low
and moderate-income individuals and families have extremely limited
opportunities to access the civil justice system.
Furthermore, dramatic cuts in federal funding for the Legal Serv-
ices Corporation ("LSC")9 have exacerbated these limitations on ac-
cess to the judicial machinery. The total funding for the LSC in 1997
was $278 million,1" a significant reduction from the $415 million ap-
propriated to the LSC in 1995.11 Even before these cuts, it is esti-
mated that legal services organizations were forced to deny over half
of their eligible clients any assistance due to inadequate resources . 2
This insufficient access to legal services affects not only the poorest
4. See, e.g., Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 25 (1981) (holding
that there is a right to counsel only when the deprivation of physical liberty is at
stake).
5. The right of self-representation in court is itself a long-standing right now codi-
fied by Federal law. See 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (1994); Goldschmidt et al., supra note 2, at
23.
6. See Carolyn A. Eldred & Roy W. Reese, Temple Univ. Inst. for Survey Re-
search, Legal Needs Among Low-Income and Moderate-Income Households: Sum-
mary of Findings from the Comprehensive Legal Needs Study 21 & tbl.4-1 (1994).
7. See id. at 19 & tbl.4-1.
8. See id. at 21 fig.4-1.
9. The Legal Services Corporation is the federal umbrella administration which
funds local legal services providers throughout the country.
10. See Departments of Commerce, Justice and State, the Judiciary, and Related
Agencies Appropriations Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321, 1321-50.
11. See Departments of Commerce, Justice and State, the Judiciary, and Related
Agencies Appropriations Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 103-317, 108 Stat. 1724, 1759
(1994). For 1999, Congress has approved an increase in the LSC budget to $300 mil-
lion from the $283 million appropriated for fiscal years 1997 and 1998. See Paul R.
Tremblay, Acting "A Very Moral Type of God": Triage Among Poor Clients, 67 Ford-
ham L. Rev. 2475, 2481 & n.23 (1999) [hereinafter Tremblay, Moral Type of God].
12. In 1994, 60% of eligible clients were turned away. See Francis J. Larkin, The
Legal Services Corporation Must Be Saved, Judges' J., Winter 1995, at 1, 2.
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citizens, but also a sizable middle-income population that cannot af-
ford the fees charged by private attorneys. 3
A suggested solution to this problem of unmet legal needs is the
development of "unbundled" legal services, also known as "discrete
task representation."' 4 This approach to the provision of legal serv-
ices suggests that lawyers break down the traditional package of full-
service representation to clients. Under this rubric, attorneys provide
assistance only with selected aspects of a legal problem, depending on
the available resources of the legal services office.' 5 Studies have
shown that without some legal advice or assistance from an attorney,
pro se litigants often forfeit a number of their legal rights." Discrete
task representation seeks to preserve these rights by allowing lawyers
to provide legal advice to pro se litigants, including assistance with the
drafting of pleadings and court documents, without actually represent-
ing the client as counsel of record. 7 This methodology would allow
legal services offices to provide legal assistance to more individuals,
potentially increasing access to justice for low-income clients.
This Note focuses on one specific form of unbundled legal assist-
ance: the drafting of pleadings and other court documents by lawyers
for clients who go on to represent themselves pro se. This practice,
known as "ghostwriting," has raised a host of potential problems, in-
cluding a possibly unethical exploitation of pro se leniency,'" viola-
tions of Rule 11,19 violations of local court rules regarding attorney
withdrawal,2" and violations of ethics rules prohibiting misrepresenta-
tion to the court.2' This Note carefully examines the few federal cases
that have condemned the practice of ghostwriting along these lines.'
It also considers the contrasting perspective of state ethics panels and
13. See Mary Helen McNeal, Redefining Attorney-Client Roles: Unbundling and
Moderate Income Elderly Clients, 32 Wake Forest L. Rev. 295, 298 (1997) [hereinafter
McNeal, Elderly Clients].
14. The terms "unbundled legal services," "discrete task legal services," and -lim-
ited legal services" are used interchangeably throughout this Note.
15. See McNeal, Elderly Clients, supra note 13, at 296.
16. See Michael Millemann et al., Limited Service Representation and Access to
Justice: An Experiment, 11 Am. J. Fam. L. 1. 1 (1997).
17. See id. at 3; Forrest S. Mosten, Unbundling of Legal Services and the Family
Lawyer, 28 Fain. L.Q. 421, 421-27 (1994) [hereinafter Mosten, Family Lawyer].
18. See Johnson v. Board of County Comm'rs. 868 F. Supp. 1126. 1231 (D. Colo.
1994).
19. See id at 1231-32.
20. See Laremont-Lopez v. Southeastern Tidewater Opportunity Ctr., 968 F.
Supp. 1075, 1079 (E.D. Va. 1997).
21. See Johnson, 868 F. Supp. at 1232; Goldschmidt et al., supra note 2, at 26;
Millemann et al., supra note 16, at 2; Elizabeth J. Cohen, Afraid of Ghosts. A.B.A. J.,
Dec. 1997, at 80, 80; Lonnie A. Powers, Pro Bono and Pro Se: Letting Clients Order
off the Menu Without Giving Yourself Indigestion, Boston BJ., May/June 1998. at 10,
10-11.
22. See Ricotta v. California, 4 F. Supp. 2d 961 (S.D. Cal. 1998); Laremont-Lopez
v. Southeastern Tidewater Opportunity Ctr., 968 F. Supp. 1075 (E.D. Va. 1997); John-
son v. Board of County Comm'rs, 868 F. Supp. 1126 (D. Colo. 1994). Though the
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bar associations, which have generally endorsed the practice as meet-
ing ethical and professional standards. 3
Part I briefly explains the concept of unbundled, or discrete-task,
legal assistance and defines ghostwriting in particular. Part I also out-
lines some potential ethical issues that the practice of unbundled legal
services might raise, and notes a few other ethical issues specific to the
practice of ghostwriting. Part II discusses the way that ethics panels,
courts, and commentators have responded to the practice of ghost-
writing. This part also suggests some guidelines to assure the ethical
viability of the practice. Part III analyzes some courts' condemnation
of ghostwriting as a violation of certain procedural rules, specifically
Rule 11 and local withdrawal rules, and offers some alternative inter-
pretations of these rules.
I. UNBUNDLED LEGAL SERVICES AND GHOSTWRITING: AN
OUTLINE OF POTENTIAL ETHICAL ISSUES
This part briefly defines the practice of unbundled, or discrete-task,
legal services in general, with particular focus on the practice of
"ghostwriting." It then proceeds to outline some of the key ethical
issues inherent in these alternative practice models and notes some
particular ethical issues that apply specifically to ghostwriting.
A. Limited Legal Services and Ghostwriting Defined
When a client seeks the assistance of a lawyer, most people assume
that the lawyer will provide full-service legal representation to that
client. This traditional model of legal representation includes every
legal service necessary to solve the client's problem from start to fin-
ish, including fact gathering, legal advice, legal research, discovery, ne-
gotiation, drafting of all required documents, and representation of
the client in court.2 4 In the full-service arrangement, "the scope of
needed [legal] services is generally decided unilaterally by the lawyer
who performs the services and then sends the client a bill that the
client is expected to pay."25 Unfortunately a substantial low- and
practice of ghostwriting might have a greater practical impact in state courts of limited
jurisdiction, the same issues identified by the federal courts are likely to apply.
23. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op.
1414 (1978); Committee on Prof'l and Judicial Ethics, Association of the Bar of the
City of New York, Formal Op. 1987-2 (1987); Committee on Prof 1 Ethics, New York
State Bar Ass'n, Opinion 613 (1990); Ethics Comm., Alaska Bar Ass'n, Ethics Op. 93-
1 (1993); Ethics Comm., North Carolina State Bar, RPC 114 (1991); Professional Con-
duct Comm., Illinois State Bar Ass'n, Opinion 849 (1983).
24. See Mosten, Family Lawyer, supra note 17, at 423.
25. Forrest S. Mosten, Unbundling Legal Services: A Key Component in the Fu-




moderate-income population is unable to engage this traditional rep-
resentational model, often for economic reasons. 2 6
Unbundled legal services, also known as discrete-task legal services,
represents a proposed alternative to the full-service representation
model. The unbundled delivery model seeks to increase access to the
judicial system, particularly for low-income populations.27 According
to the unbundled model, lawyers provide a prospective client with a
choice of assistance from a list of discrete legal tasks, instead of the
traditional full-service package.' For instance, the lawyer may pro-
vide one or a combination of services, such as providing limited legal
advice, doing legal research, drafting court pleadings or correspon-
dence, or coaching a client regarding approaches to a negotiation or
mediation.29 Once the client selects the services to be performed, the
lawyer would contract with the client to provide those services only.30
Models of limited legal assistance delivery range from "brief ad-
vice," such as a simple answer to a specific legal question, to the provi-
sion of substantial assistance with a legal problem, such as drafting
court documents or teaching classes on representing oneself pro se. 1
Also, contexts in which these models can be practiced vary widely.
They might be provided by private attorneys for a limited fee, by legal
services offices with legal hotlines or informational websites, or in pro
se clinics run by law schools providing legal advice and court forms.3 2
In each of these contexts, the unbundled legal service delivery
model provides greater access to needed legal advice and assistance
for low and moderate-income populations. Moderate-income clients
who do not qualify for free legal aid but are unable to afford the full-
service package are able to contract for limited assistance with a fixed
price.33 In the context of poverty law, unbundled services models al-
low community legal services offices to distribute their scarce re-
sources over a much broader client base?' Regardless of the
26. See Consortium on Legal Servs. and the Pub., American Bar Ass'n, Agenda
for Access: The American People and Civil Justice 10 (1996) [hereinafter Agenda for
Access]; supra notes 6-12 and accompanying text.
27. See Millemann et al., supra note 16, at 2; Mosten, Family Lawyer, supra note
17, at 424-25; Vernetta L. Walker, Legal Needs of the Public in the Future, Fla. B.J.,
May 1997, at 42, 42.
28. See Mosten, Family Lawyer, supra note 17, at 423.
29. See Mosten, Unbundling, supra note 25, at 10.
30. See id at 11.
31. See Mary Helen McNeal, Having One Oar or Being Without a Boat. Reflec-
tions on the Fordham Recommendations on Limited Legal Assistance, 67 Fordham L
Rev. 2617, 2621-22 (1999) [hereinafter McNeal, One Oar].
32. See id. at 2622-23.
33. See Mosten, Family Lawyer, supra note 17, at 423. Mosten argues that unbun-
dled services models are valuable not only because they increase the availability of
legal assistance, but also because they give clients more control over their own legal
decisions. See id at 423-25.
34. It is important to recognize that discrete-task models in the low-income con-
text would not necessarily involve client choice, but would instead reflect legal serv-
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circumstances in which it is practiced, the unbundling methodology is
consistent with the exhortation of the ABA Consortium on Legal
Services and the Public that alternative practice models be developed
to increase access to justice.35
One particular form of limited legal assistance, known as "ghost-
writing," consists of the drafting of pleadings and other court docu-
ments by attorneys for clients who go on to represent themselves in
court pro se. 36 In the paradigm ghostwriting scenario, the lawyer's
assistance is specifically limited to the drafting of particular pleadings
or other court documents. 37 The documents are then filed by the liti-
gant herself, and the attorney has no further involvement with the
case.38 Ghostwriting can occur in several contexts. For example, a
litigant might contract with an attorney to draft a pleading for a fee.39
Or, alternatively, a legal services office might offer to provide ghost-
writing assistance to a client if resource limitations prevent full-service
representation of the client in court.40
It is important to recognize that ghostwriting is not always practiced
according to the paradigm outlined above where a lawyer drafts com-
plete pleadings for a pro se litigant and then terminates the represen-
tation entirely. Instead, ghostwriting assistance can be given at
varying levels of depth and attorney involvement in a pro se litigant's
case. For example, an attorney may agree to provide continuing pro-
cedural or other legal advice to the pro se litigant during the course of
the proceedings.4' On the other hand, an attorney might agree solely
to review an initial pleading for adequate detail, thus having a mini-
mal hand in the actual drafting.4" Different degrees of ghostwriting
assistance can generate different kinds of ethical or procedural
problems.43
ices offices' own determinations about how to most effectively distribute their
resources so as to benefit the greatest number of clients. See generally Tremblay,
Moral Type of God, supra note 11, at 2479-84 (1999) (discussing the allocation of
scarce legal services resources).
35. See Agenda for Access, supra note 26, at 10-14.
36. See Cohen, supra note 21, at 80; George W. Overton, Lawyers as Ghosts, Chi-
cago B. Ass'n Rec., Nov. 1995, at 41, 41; Carole R. Richelieu, Ghostwriting, Haw. B.J.,
Oct. 1996, at 18, 18.
37. See, e.g., Powers, supra note 21, at 22 (discussing a possible scenario where a
lawyer agrees only to do particular work for a client.)
38. See generally Mosten, Unbundling, supra note 25, at 9-10 (describing different
forms of limited assistance a lawyer might provide, including ghostwriting).
39. See Mosten, Family Lawyer, supra note 17, at 425-26 (describing possible fee
arrangements for attorneys performing discrete legal tasks).
40. See generally McNeal, One Oar, supra note 31, at 2636-37.
41. See Mosten, Family Lawyer, supra note 17, at 428-30 (listing a range of possi-
ble degrees of assistance that a lawyer might provide to a pro se litigant).
42. See Mosten, Unbundling, supra note 25, at 10 (suggesting that ghostwriting can
involve actually drafting pleadings or simply providing review of the client's own
drafts).
43. See infra notes 205-10 and accompanying text.
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B. Ethical Implications of Limited Legal Services and Ghostwriting
As private lawyers and legal services offices for the poor have be-
gun to implement various models of discrete-task legal assistance, it is
necessary to closely examine the ethical implications of this practice.
The fundamental task of this analysis is to determine how different
limited service delivery models can be implemented without compro-
mising clients' interests as defined by established ethics rules. Be-
cause the range of possible models of limited legal assistance is so
broad, from the provision of legal advice on telephone hotlines to the
ghostwriting of pleadings for pro se litigants, consideration of all the
different ethical implications is a substantial task." This section
briefly recounts some of the ethical issues raised by commentators re-
garding the provision of limited legal services in general. It then spe-
cifically addresses potential ethical problems engendered by the
practice of ghostwriting.
1. The Ethics of Limited Legal Assistance in General
Applying established ethics rules to burgeoning models of limited
legal services is difficult because the rules themselves are formulated
under the assumption that lawyers always provide full-service repre-
sentation.4 5 Therefore, many of the ethical issues raised by unbundled
legal assistance models are problems of interpreting the rules for the
purposes of these new methodologies, not necessarily per se violations
of the rules themselves.
Of all ethical norms promulgated in the Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct,46 perhaps none is more difficult to apply to discrete-
task legal services models than the requirement of attorney compe-
tence.47 As Model Rule 1.1 mandates, "[a] lawyer shall provide com-
petent representation to a client."' 48  Further, "competent
44. For a detailed discussion of the ethical implications of a wide variety of unbun-
dled legal services models that is beyond the scope of this Note, see generally Mc-
Neal, One Oar, supra note 31.
45. See, e.g., i. at 2638. ("Because Model Rule 1.1 envisions only traditional, full
service representation, it is of little assistance in determining how this standard might
be applied [to discrete task models]." (footnote omitted)).
46. This Note refers to the Model Rules of Professional Conduct in discussing
established ethical norms. Though the Model Rules have been adopted in whole or
substantial part by forty-one states, see Stephen Gillers & Roy D. Simon, Regulation
of Lawyers: Statutes and Standards at xix (1999), some states' ethics codes are based
on the previous Model Code of Professional Conduct, including New York State,
while others diverge substantially from both the Model Rules and the Model Code.
See id. at xix-xx. A discussion of the ethical norms promulgated by the Model Rules,
however, is sufficient to provide a ground for general analysis of the ethical implica-
tions of limited legal assistance in all jurisdictions.
47. See Michelle S. Jacobs, Legal Professionalism: Do Ethical Rules Require Zeal-
ous Representation for Poor People?, 8 St. Thomas L. Rev. 97 (1995) (providing a
general discussion of whether the ethics rules can adequately assure legal competence
in the poverty law context).
48. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.1 (1998).
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representation" is defined as requiring "the legal knowledge, skill,
thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the represen-
tation. '49 Additionally, a comment to Model Rule 1.1 observes that
"[p]erhaps the most fundamental legal skill consists of determining
what kind of legal problems a situation may involve."5" The question
thus becomes whether the provision of legal services outside the tradi-
tional full-service model constitutes the competent practice of law.
According to Model Rule 1.1, discrete-task legal services delivery
models could be considered ethically incompetent representation un-
less they involved an adequate investigation of the client's legal prob-
lem taken as a whole.5 1
This "adequate inquiry" requirement inherent in the competence
rule has different implications on different models of limited legal
services delivery.52 For instance, a volunteer attorney staffing a gen-
eral legal hotline can competently answer a simple question about a
traffic ticket without a thorough inquiry into the underlying legal and
factual circumstances. 3 On the other hand, an attorney who has
agreed to provide more substantial limited assistance, such as ghost-
writing a pleading, would be required to engage in substantially
greater investigation of her client's legal circumstances as a whole to
properly determine what further assistance may be required.54
The requirement under Model Rule 1.3 that attorneys provide "dili-
gent" representation55 provides similar interpretive difficulties in its
application to limited legal services delivery models. The exhortation
contained in the first comment to this rule, that "[a] lawyer should
pursue a matter on behalf of a client despite opposition, obstruction
or personal inconvenience to the lawyer,"56 practically defines what
most clients expect from the traditional full-service model of represen-
tation. It is unclear, however, what this rhetoric of zealous advocacy
requires of a lawyer providing unbundled services.57 In deference to
lawyer discretion, Model Rule 1.3 provides greater leeway in deter-
mining the scope of its diligence mandate than does the competence
49. Id.
50. Id. Rule 1.1 cmt. [2]. Additionally, Comment [5] suggests that competence
requires "inquiry into and analysis of the factual and legal elements of the problem."
Id. Rule 1.1 cmt. [5].
51. See McNeal, Elderly Clients, supra note 13, at 318-25.
52. See generally McNeal, One Oar, supra note 31, at 2638-40 (discussing the ethi-
cal distinctions between unbundled services that entail simple, brief advice, and those
which entail more substantial assistance).
53. See id. at 2629-30.
54. See id. at 2637.
55. Rule 1.3 states: "A lawyer shall act with reasonable diligence and promptness
in representing a client." Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.3.
56. Id. Rule 1.3 cmt. [1].
57. See McNeal, Elderly Clients, supra note 13, at 321.
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required by Model Rule 1.1.58 In fact, Model Rule 1.3 notes that the
Model Rules grant attorneys "discretion" over limiting the scope of
their representation. 9
Model Rule 1.3 generates further ambiguity regarding its applica-
tion to limited services delivery models. Comment [3] to the Rule
begins by stating that "[u]nless the [attorney-client] relationship is ter-
minated as provided in Model Rule 1.16, a lawyer should carry
through to conclusion all matters undertaken for a client."' This sug-
gests that the diligence requirement might prohibit limited legal serv-
ices. The comment also notes, however, that "[i]f a lawyer's
employment is limited to a specific matter, the relationship terminates
when the matter has been resolved.' The comments themselves
thus highlight the possible contradictions between diligence as under-
stood in relation to the full-service model and diligent representation
in a limited services context.
Another ethical consideration that limited legal services models
must contend with is the aforementioned Model Rule 1.16, which pro-
vides that an attorney may only withdraw from a representation if
such withdrawal will not harm the client's interests. 62 A strict inter-
pretation of this rule would render discrete-task legal services like
ghostwriting impossible, because most clients would obviously be bet-
ter served by representation that continued through the conclusion of
their problem. Model Rule 1.16, however, provides several caveats to
its stringent protection of a client's interest by allowing discretionary
withdrawal in certain limited circumstances or generally for "good
cause." 63 In fact, one comment to the rule comes close to actually
condoning limited-legal-services practice: "A lawyer may withdraw if
58. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.3 cmt. [11 ("A lawyer has
professional discretion in determining the means by which a matter should be
pursued.").
59. See id.
60. Id. Rule 1.3 cmt. [3].
61. Id.
62. See id. Rule 1.16(b) ("[A] lawyer may withdraw from representing a client if
withdrawal can be accomplished without material adverse effect on the interests of
the client.").
63. Model Rule 1.16 allows withdrawal regardless of its effect on the client's inter-
ests if:
(1) the client persists in a course of action involving the lawyer's services
that the lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or fraudulent;
(2) the client has used the lawyer's services to perpetrate a crime or fraud;
(3) a client insists upon pursuing an objective that the lawyer considers re-
pugnant or imprudent;
(4) the client fails substantially to fulfill an obligation to the lawyer regard-
ing the lawyer's services and has been given reasonable warning that the
lawyer will withdraw unless the obligation is fulfilled;
(5) the representation will result in an unreasonable financial burden on the
lawyer or has been rendered unreasonably difficult by the client; or




the client refuses to abide by the terms of an agreement relating to the
representation, such as an agreement concerning fees or court costs or
an agreement limiting the objectives of the representation. ' 64 This
provision for an agreement limiting the objectives of a representation
also inflects the diligence required by Model Rule 1.3, which makes
reference to Model Rule 1.16 in allowing a variable scope of interpre-
tations of diligent representation.
The rule that applies most tangibly to an exploration of the ethical
propriety of unbundled legal services arrangements is Model Rule 1.2,
which concerns the ethically allowable scope of legal representation. 66
Again, the rule itself suggests contrary conclusions in regard to un-
bundling issues. Initially, the Rule states that a lawyer "shall abide by
a client's decisions concerning the objectives of representation."67
This reiterates the fact that the Model Rules were formulated with
full-service representation, and clients who are able to afford it, in
mind. Model Rule 1.2(c), however, states that "[a] lawyer may limit
the objectives of the representation if the client consents after
consultation. 68
Other ethics rules that might require reinterpretation in regard to
certain forms of discrete-task representation include Model Rule 1.6,
which requires strict confidentiality between attorney and client,69 and
Model Rule 1.7, which prohibits representation that generates a con-
flict of interest.7° Though these rules apply to all forms of unbundled
legal assistance, they generate the most problems for telephone hot-
lines, legal advice websites, and other forms of services delivery that
involve limited assistance to a very large volume of clients.71
2. Ethical Issues Specific to Ghostwriting
Though all of the possible ethics issues discussed above apply with
equal or greater force to attorney ghostwriting of pleadings for pro se
litigants, the practice of ghostwriting also raises a unique set of poten-
tial ethical problems. Because a ghostwriting attorney generally drafts
documents for her client knowing that they will eventually be filed in
court, all of the ethics rules regarding the attorney's duties to the court
and to opposing counsel apply. Therefore, a ghostwriting attorney's
ethical considerations cannot be limited to adequate regard for her
64. Id. Rule 1.16 cmt. [8].
65. See id. Rule 1.3 cmt. [3].
66. See id. Rule 1.2.
67. Id. Rule 1.2(a).
68. Id. Rule 1.2(c).
69. See id. Rule 1.6.
70. See id. Rule 1.7.
71. See McNeal, One Oar, supra note 31, at 2624-31. It is unclear, for instance,
how diligently the providers of a legal advice website must check for all possible con-
flicts of interest among the large number of potentially anonymous clients. Cf. id. at
2626-30 (considering ethical difficulties in the telephone hotline context).
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client's interest, but must include the interests of the courts and op-
posing parties involved in the envisioned litigation. In this regard, the
Model Rules specifically impose a duty of candor toward the court
regarding all representations made by an attorney in such court," a
duty of fairness to the opposing party,73 and a duty to avoid bringing
non-meritorious claims in a court proceeding.74
The duty of candor toward the court mandated by Model Rule 3.375
is particularly significant to ghostwritten pleadings. If neither a ghost-
writing attorney nor her pro se litigant client disclose the fact that any
pleadings ostensibly filed by a self-represented litigant were actually
drafted by the attorney, this could itself violate the duty of candor.
The practice of undisclosed ghostwriting might be particularly prob-
lematic in light of the special leniency afforded pro se pleadings in the
courts.7 6 This leniency is designed to compensate for pro se litigants'
lack of legal assistance.' Thus, if courts mistakenly believe that the
ghostwritten pleading was drafted without legal assistance, they might
apply an unwarranted degree of leniency to a pleading that was actu-
ally drafted with the assistance of counsel.7" This situation might cre-
ate confusion for the court and unfairness toward opposing parties. It
is therefore likely that the failure to disclose ghostwriting assistance to
courts and opposing parties amounts to a failure "to disclose a mate-
rial fact to a tribunal when disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a
criminal or fraudulent act by the client," which is prohibited by Model
Rule 3.3.79 Undisclosed ghostwriting would also likely qualify as pro-
fessional misconduct under Model Rules 8.4(c) and (d), prohibiting
conduct involving a misrepresentation, and conduct that is prejudicial
to the administration of justice, respectively.'
It is also important to recognize that Model Rule 1.16, generally
prohibiting withdrawal that would materially harm the client's inter-
ests,8 ' is of particular importance to any analysis of ghostwriting. Be-
72. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.3.
73. See id. Rule 3.4.
74. See id. Rule 3.1. Rule 3.1 closely parallels the requirements of Rule II of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, discussed hifra at Part III.A.
75. Model Rule 3.3 reads, in pertinent part:
(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly:
(1) make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal;
(2) fail to disclose a material fact to a tribunal when disclosure is neces-
sary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent act by the client ....
(b) The duties stated in paragraph (a) continue to the conclusion of the pro-
ceeding, and apply even if compliance requires disclosure of information
otherwise protected by Rule 1.6.
Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.3.
76. See infra Part II.A.
77. See infra notes 85-94 and accompanying text.
78. See infra notes 109-13, 134-37, 147-48 and accompanying text.
79. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 3.3(a)(2).
80. See iL Rule 8.4(c)-(d).
81. See id. Rule 1.16.
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cause a ghostwriting attorney may provide substantial assistance in
preparation for litigation, her withdrawal from the representation
before the litigation would likely harm the client's best interests.
Thus, the attorney must be certain that the services are provided in a
way that withdrawal is accomplished in accordance with the "good
cause" and other exceptions listed in Rule 1.16.82
It is clear that the Model Rules potentially pose a number of ethical
obstacles to a ghostwriting attorney. Part II examines the ways in
which ethics panels, courts, and other commentators have applied and
interpreted these ethical norms in regard to ghostwriting. In particu-
lar, it provides an analysis of potential conflicts between courts' con-
demnation of ghostwriting and ethics panels' endorsement of the
practice.
II. APPLICATIONS OF ETHICAL NORMS TO GHOSTWRITING BY
ETHICS PANELS, COURTS, AND COMMENTATORS
If ghostwriting is to become a valued and acceptable method of
legal assistance, one that might increase access to the judicial system
for low and moderate-income populations, it must be practiced in an
ethical fashion. To do so, it is necessary to fully understand how
courts, ethics panels, and other commentators have applied some of
the potential ethical problems outlined above to the practice of ghost-
writing. This part considers the discrepancy between the courts' vehe-
ment condemnation of ghostwriting 3  and the more lenient
perspective of state ethics panels, which generally condone the prac-
tice. 4 In addition, this part explores other potential ethical issues that
have thus far not been raised by courts or ethics panels in regard to
ghostwriting, such as the competence and diligence requirements con-
tained in the Model Rules of Professional Conduct. Finally, this part
suggests that ghostwriting can be an entirely ethical practice so long as
certain basic guidelines are followed that address the concerns of
courts and ethics panels.
A. Pro Se Leniency
To properly understand the ethical analyses of ghostwriting offered
by the ethics panels and district courts, one must recognize the extent
to which pro se litigants receive special lenience in the district courts.
It is well-established that pro se pleadings are held to "less stringent
standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers" when a federal
court is considering dismissal." In fact, the Supreme Court has de-
82. See id.; infra notes 184-89 and accompanying text.
83. See infra Part II.C.
84. See infra Part II.B.
85. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972); see Hughes v. Rowe, 449 U.S. 5, 15
(1980); Karim-Panahi v. Los Angeles Police Dep't, 839 F.2d 621, 623 (9th Cir. 1988);
Bates v. Jean, 745 F.2d 1146, 1150 (7th Cir. 1984).
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fined the 12(b)(6)8 6 standard that specifically applies to pro se liti-
gants: "Such a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a
claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no
set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief."s
The generous manner in which courts construe pro se pleadings is
not limited to giving the pleaded facts their maximum effect.s Some
courts also recognize possible legal causes of action suggested by the
facts alleged in the pleading, even if the pleading itself makes no men-
tion of such causes of action.89 Further, federal courts must also give
pro se litigants wide leeway to amend deficient complaints9° and must
explain to the litigant why such complaints are legally deficient and
how they might be amended.91 In other words, "[tihe court must do
more than simply advise the pro se plaintiff that his complaint needs
to be shorter and more concise."' Also, the lenient reading of pro se
pleadings applies not only to motions for dismissal on the pleadings,
but also extends to pro se responses to motions for summary judgment
against them.93 Finally, courts will tolerate substantial procedural er-
rors by pro se litigants that would not otherwise be permitted if the
litigant were represented by counsel. 94
86. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (concerning dismissal for failure to state a claim).
87. Hughes, 449 U.S. at 10.
88. See Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d Cir. 1994) ("Ve read [the pro se
party's] supporting papers liberally, and will interpret them to raise the strongest ar-
guments that they suggest.").
89. See, e.g., Fiore v. City of New York, No. 97 Civ. 4935(WK), 1998 WL 755134,
at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 26, 1998) ("Though plaintiff invokes Title VII as his only federal
cause of action in the 1995 DHR complaint, we believe that in light of the liberal
construction typically afforded to pro se litigants, we could construe that complaint to
invoke the protections of the ADA." (citing Burgos v. Hopkins, 14 F.3d 787, 790 (2d
Cir. 1994))).
90. See Karim-Panahi, 839 F.2d at 623 ("A pro se litigant must be given leave to
amend his or her complaint unless it is 'absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the
complaint could not be cured by amendment."' (quoting Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d
1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987))).
91. See id. at 623-24 ("Moreover, before dismissing a pro se civil rights compliant
for failure to state a claim, the district court must give the plaintiff a statement of the
complaint's deficiencies." (citations omitted)).
92. Id at 625.
93. See Richardson v. Kelaher, No. 97 Civ. 0428(LAP), 1998 WL 812042, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 1998). It is important to note that the leniency afforded pro se
responses is not unlimited. In Richardson, the pro se plaintiff defeated summary judg-
ment on her due process claim against the agency which administered food stamps.
See id at *9. Summary judgment was granted to the supervisor of the agency, how-
ever, because the pro se plaintiff failed to controvert the defendant's factual assertions
in his motion despite the fact that she had been specifically informed that all uncon-
troverted statements would be taken as true. See id. at *8 n.2.
94. See Bates v. Jean, 745 F.2d 1146, 1150 (7th Cir. 1984) (finding that a pro se
litigant's failure to make a timely objection to the jury's inconsistent verdict did not
necessarily waive his right to appeal).
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B. Ethics Panels' Analyses of Ghostwriting
The first ABA ethics opinion dealing with the subject of ghost-
writing involved a case in which a lawyer provided substantially more
legal assistance than simply drafting the pleadings.95 The lawyer not
only drafted the pro se litigant's pleading, but also sat in on the trial
and offered continuing procedural advice to the pro se litigant
throughout the litigation.96 In its ruling, the ethics committee at-
tempted to draw a line between acceptable and unacceptable degrees
of assistance.97 The committee found that such undisclosed "active
and extensive assistance from the lawyer in preparation for the trial as
well as during the trial itself" was a misrepresentation to the court, in
violation of DR 1-102(A) of the Model Code.98 The committee quali-
fied its opinion, however, by making clear that this ruling did not "in-
tend to suggest that a lawyer may never give advice to a [pro se]
litigant, or that a lawyer could not.., prepare.., a pleading for a [pro
se] litigant . . . ."99 Thus, this initial ethical analysis of ghostwriting
fundamentally endorsed the practice of drafting pleadings for pro se
litigants. It reserved its condemnation for more extensive undisclosed
assistance beyond drafting pleadings or providing limited advice. 00
The Illinois State Bar Association made a similar distinction be-
tween drafting pleadings and providing more substantial assistance to
pro se litigants. 1' In a 1983 opinion, the Illinois Bar endorsed the
practice of attorney preparation of pleadings for divorce litigants who
went on to appear pro se without any further involvement the litiga-
tion itself.10 2 The opinion, however, also required that the attorney
take steps to make sure that his withdrawal from representation after
the provision of limited services did not prejudice the client's interests
as required by DR 2-110(A)(2)10 3 of the Model Code.1"4




98. Id.; see also Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 1-102(A)(4)(1983) (prohibiting attorney assistance in a client's misrepresentation or fraud).
99. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1414
(1978).
100. See id.
101. See Professional Conduct Comm., Illinois State Bar Ass'n, Opinion 849 (1983).
102. See id.
103. The older Model Code's DR 2-110(A)(2) is directly analogous to Rule 1.16 of
the Model Rules. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
104. As the Illinois State Bar observed:
[S]uch steps would at least include being certain that the client fully under-
stands: the merits of the client's position; the position which the other party
to the litigation is likely to take; the procedures involved in a trial of the
matter, including the requirements for a valid prove-up of the client's case;
and, the consequences of the attorney's failure to appear or act in the pro-
ceeding on behalf of the client.
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Two years later, the same bar association admonished as unethical a
bankruptcy attorney who provided limited drafting service to his cli-
ents and subsequently refused to attend hearings or meetings with
creditors. 10 5 It distinguished this opinion from its earlier approval of
ghostwriting by pointing out that "there is a material difference in that
here an attorney, while still appearing of record in the case, is at-
tempting to limit the scope of his employment."10 6 In its second opin-
ion, however, the Illinois Bar was not concerned that the limited
representation amounted to a misrepresentation to the tribunal, a
concern voiced in the earlier ABA opinion, 107 but rather that the at-
torney's actions were inconsistent with the ethical requirements of
zealous advocacy and attorney competence."t 8 In other words, the Il-
linois Bar was concerned not that ghostwriting itself was unethical, but
that it might prejudice the client's interest in certain circumstances.
While neither of the Illinois opinions addressed the fact that undis-
closed ghostwriting might unfairly exploit pro se leniency afforded by
the courts, two ethics opinions from New York directly focus on this
issue. The first, promulgated by the New York City Bar's ethics com-
mittee, cautions that undisclosed ghostwriting does indeed unduly
prejudice the party opposing the pro se litigant who would unfairly
benefit from special pro se treatment. 0 9 As a solution, the opinion
suggests that the ghostwriting attorney endorse the pleadings that she
drafts with the words "Prepared by Counsel.""' Such an endorse-
ment would alert the court and the opposing counsel that the pro se
litigant received legal assistance, and any lenient treatment accorded
Professional Conduct Comm., Illinois State Bar Ass'n, Opinion 849 (1983). These
requirements would be addressed in the diagnostic interview process. See infra Part
II.E.2.
105. See Professional Conduct Comm., Illinois State Bar Ass'n, Opinion 85-6
(1985).
106. Id.
107. See supra note 98 and accompanying text.
108. In the words of the second Illinois opinion:
We cannot take on the responsibility of representing a client only in those
facets or portions of the case that interests us while ignoring or leaving the
client to fend for himself if we are inconvenienced or for some reason do not
have the time, ability or inclination to assist the client in all matters.
Professional Conduct Comm., Illinois State Bar Ass'n, Opinion 85-6 (1985) (citing
Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 6-101 and DR 7-101). Again, the
Model Code's zealousness and diligence provisions are similar to the requirements of
Model Rules 1.1 and 1.3. See supra notes 47-61 and accompanying text.
109. See Committee on Prof'l and Judicial Ethics, Association of the Bar of the City
of New York, Formal Op. 1987-2 (1987) ("[The pro se litigant] may be given deferen-
tial or preferential treatment to the disadvantage of his adversary. The court will have
been burdened unnecessarily with the extra labor of making certain that his rights as a
pro se litigant were fully protected." (citing Klein v. Spear, Leeds & Kellogg, 309 F.




her pro se status could be modified accordingly."' As part of this
solution, the committee makes a distinction between providing some
legal advice to pro se litigants, which does not require disclosure, and
"active and substantial assistance," including ghostwriting, which does
require disclosure. 12 The committee concludes that disclosing the re-
ceipt of legal assistance, along with the inclusion of the words "Pre-
pared by Counsel" on attorney-drafted pleadings, adequately
alleviates unfairness to the court without requiring the attorney to dis-
close her identity. 113 The committee went so far as to praise the
ghostwriting attorney, observing that, under these circumstances, she
"is taking action consistent with the duty of the legal profession to
meet the needs of the public for legal services" by providing limited
legal services to a client who cannot afford full representation. 14
Similarly, an ethics opinion promulgated by the New York State
Bar also recognizes that ghostwriting is a way for legal service provid-
ers with limited resources to assist more people. 115 The opinion none-
theless concludes, as did the New York City Bar's opinion, that
ghostwriting without disclosure is a severe enough misrepresentation
to violate DR 1-102(A)(4)." 6 Thus, the State Bar opinion requires
the ghostwriting attorney to disclose that the pro se litigant received
legal assistance." 7 By mandating that the ghostwriting attorney dis-
close her identity, however, the State Bar diverges from the City Bar's
opinion, which simply requires the endorsement "prepared by coun-
sel" on a ghostwritten pleading." 8
In contrast to these New York opinions, which require the disclo-
sure of ghostwriting assistance to prevent possible unfairness, a Vir-
ginia ethics opinion simply concludes that undisclosed ghostwriting
violates a court rule requiring that ghostwriting attorneys reveal them-
111. The opinion emphasizes that the ghostwriting attorney must also receive assur-
ances from the pro se litigant that the litigant will disclose the assistance she has re-
ceived. If she does not do so, the lawyer must refuse to provide any assistance and
immediately terminate the representation to avoid violating Model Code of Profes-
sional Responsibility DR 1-102(A)(4) and DR 7-102(A)(7). See id.
112. Id.
113. See id. A ghostwriting attorney might be reluctant to disclose her identity due
to fear of possible sanctions for violations of Rule 11 or being forced to file a formal
appearance by local withdrawal rules. See infra Part III.
114. Committee on Prof'l and Judicial Ethics, Association of the Bar of the City of
New York, Formal Op. 1987-2 (1997).
115. See Committee on Prof'l Ethics, New York State Bar Ass'n, Opinion 613
(1990) ("The overriding concern pertinent to this inquiry is the recognition in EC 2-25
that the pro bono 'efforts of individual lawyers,' together with the availability of legal
services offices, 'are often not enough to meet the need' of the indigent.").
116. See id. at 2. New York's DR 1-102(A)(4), taken from the old Model Code,
Model Code of Professional Responsibility (1981), directly parallels Model Rules 3.3
(a)(2) and 8.4(c) and (d). See supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.





selves to the court.119 According to this reasoning, ghost-writing would
violate ethics rules that prohibit advising clients to disregard court
rules.'" The opinion concludes, however, that so long as the ghost-
writing attorney complies with this rule by disclosing her assistance,
there is no other ethical prohibition of ghostwriting assistance. ' 2 The
opinion also cautions that a ghostwriting attorney would still be re-
quired to abide by ethical standards of wvithdrawal and is prohibited
from contracting to limit malpractice liability.'2
Two other ethics opinions, from Alaska and North Carolina, specifi-
cally sanction ghostwriting by legal services attorneys for indigent pro
se litigants as an ethically sound practice, without analyzing the spec-
trum of different degrees of legal assistance that lawyers might pro-
vide for pro se litigants.'2 The Alaska opinion concludes that
undisclosed legal assistance is not an ethically problematic misrepre-
sentation because courts are generally able to discern when a pro se
litigant has received legal help with her pleadings and can mediate pro
se leniency accordingly. 124 The North Carolina opinion provides little
analysis of the issue except to say that the ghostwriting attorney would
be responsible for fulfilling ethical requirements of confidentiality and
competence.'2
Despite some variance in regard to the details of their decisions, all
of these ethics opinions fundamentally conclude that ghostwriting it-
self is an ethically acceptable practice. Indeed, the New York City and
State Bar opinions recognized that ghostwriting furthers lawyers' duty
to meet the legal needs of the public.126 As the State Bar suggested,
"the creation of barriers to the procurement of legal advice by those
in need and who are unable to pay in the name of legal ethics ill serves
the profession."'21 7 According to most of these ethics opinions, how-
ever, ghostwriting attorneys must be careful to fulfill certain ethical
obligations. Ghostwriting must be disclosed to the court and opposing
parties to avoid a material misrepresentation to the court and oppos-
ing parties, in violation of Model Rules 3.3 and 8.4.1' But it remains





123. See Ethics Comm., Alaska Bar Ass'n, Ethics Op. 93-1 (1993); Ethics Comm.,
North Carolina State Bar, RPC 114 (1991).
124. See Ethics Comm., Alaska Bar Ass'n, Ethics Op. 93-1 (1993).
125. See Ethics Comm., North Carolina State Bar, RPC 114 (1991).
126. See Committee on Prof'l and Judicial Ethics, Association of the Bar of the City
of New York, Formal Op. 1987-2 (1987); Committee on Prof'l Ethics, New York State
Bar Ass'n, Opinion 613 (1990).
127. Committee on Prof'l Ethics, New York State Bar Ass'n, Opinion 613 (1990).
128. See id.; see also Committee on Prof'l and Judicial Ethics, Association of the
Bar of the City of New York, Formal Op. 1987-2 (1987); Standing Comm. on Legal
Ethics, Virginia State Bar, Legal Ethics Op. 1127 (1988). Note, however, that the
Alaska opinion does not believe that undisclosed ghostwriting should be categorized
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unclear whether adequate disclosure must include disclosure of the
ghostwriting attorney's identity.129
Most importantly, the ethics committees also uniformly conclude
that the practice of ghostwriting creates an attorney-client relationship
and all of its attendant obligations. 3 These obligations would include
attorney diligence and competence, maintaining client confidentiality,
and assuring that withdrawal does not unduly prejudice the client. 31
According to this analysis, the mere fact that legal assistance is limited
cannot justify disregard for ethical standards of attorney conduct, par-
ticularly regarding obligations to the client.
C. Courts' Vehement Condemnation of Undisclosed Ghostwriting
In contrast to the cautious endorsement of ghostwriting in ABA
and state bar ethics opinions, the few district courts that have explic-
itly addressed ghostwriting strongly condemn the practice as an uneth-
ical misrepresentation to the court. For example, in Johnson v. Board
of County Commissioners,32 the court determined that though the
county sheriff's defense pleadings in a sexual harassment suit had os-
tensibly been filed pro se, the pleadings were actually ghostwritten by
an attorney employed by the county attorney's office.' 33 Upon this
discovery, the court condemned the pleadings: "[Undisclosed ghost-
writing] necessarily causes the court to apply the wrong tests in its
decisional process .... The pro se litigant would be granted greater
as a misrepresentation, since courts should be able to tell when pro se litigants have
received drafting assistance. See Ethics Comm., Alaska Bar Ass'n, Ethics Op. 93-1
(1993).
129. Analysis of courts' application of Rule 11 to ghostwriting suggests that an at-
torney's identity should be disclosed. See infra text accompanying notes 288-91.
130. See Committee on Prof'l and Judicial Ethics, Association of the Bar of the City
of New York, Formal Op. 1987-2 (1987) ("Although the lawyer is not appearing of
record, his obligations to his client are no different because of that fact."); Committee
on Prof'l Ethics, New York State Bar Ass'n, Opinion 613 (1990) ("Full and adequate
disclosures of the intended scope and consequences of the lawyer-client relationship
must be made to the [pro se] litigant."); Ethics Comm., Alaska Bar Ass'n, Ethics Op.
93-1 (1993) ("When an attorney limits the scope of his representation, an attorney-
client relationship is still created ... with all the attendant duties and responsibilities
called out in the Professional Canons."); Ethics Comm. North Carolina State Bar,
RPC 114 (1991) ("[A]ttorney-client relationships would generally be formed under
such circumstances and the Rules of Professional Conduct, particularly those concern-
ing confidentiality and conflict of interest would apply."); Professional Conduct
Comm., Illinois State Bar Ass'n, Opinion 85-6 (1985) (finding that lawyer represent-
ing client without appearing in court failed to fulfill obligations established by attor-
ney-client relationship); Professional Conduct Comm., Illinois State Bar Ass'n,
Opinion 849 (1983) (concluding that a ghostwriter would be bound by ethics rules
regarding competence and withdrawal); Standing Comm. on Legal Ethics, Virginia
State Bar, Legal Ethics Op. 1127 (1988) ("[B]y providing legal advice and assistance
to the pro se litigant ... the attorney-client relationship is established.").
131. See infra Part II.E.2.
132. 868 F. Supp. 1226 (D. Colo. 1994).
133. See id. at 1231.
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latitude as a matter of judicial discretion .... The entire process
would be skewed to the distinct disadvantage of the nonoffending
party.' 134
Johnson not only held that the undisclosed ghostwriting was unfair
to adverse parties in the case, but that it also violated Model Code of
Professional Responsibility DR 1-102(A)(4), which prohibits attorney
conduct involving "dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation,"'-
and Colorado Rule of Professional Conduct 1.2(d), which prohibits
giving advice or assistance in an act "that the lawyer knows is criminal
or fraudulent. ' 136 The court reasoned that the unfair exploitation of
pro se leniency through undisclosed ghostwriting amounted to a
fraudulent act due to the resulting unfairness to opposing parties.'37
Because the court doubted, however, that the ghostwriting attorney
intentionally violated her ethical duties by drafting the defense plead-
ings, it declined to impose sanctions. 38 But the court warned that the
opinion put attorneys on notice that ghostwriting was unethical, and
that future ghostwriters would not escape contempt sanctions. 139
The Eastern District of Virginia identified an identical ethical viola-
tion in Laremont-Lopez v. Southeastern Tidewater Opportunity
Center,1' ° an opinion specifically written to condemn the behavior of
the attorneys responsible for another incident of ghostwriting plead-
ings for ostensibly pro se litigants.' 4 ' Laremont-Lopez combined four
different cases in which several attorneys within a law firm drafted
complaints for different plaintiffs who had received right-to-sue letters
from the EEOC and wanted to commence employment discrimination
actions before the filing deadline expired. 42 Most of the attorneys
were paid a flat fee for their limited service of drafting the pleadings,
and the plaintiffs proceeded to file the pleadings pro se.' 43 In some
instances, the attorneys paid the filing fees, and their couriers filed the
complaints with the court. 44 In one case, the attorneys effectuated
service on the defendant, and in another case, they actually made a
formal appearance as the counsel of record.' 45 The district court's
opinion contained nothing about the merits of the plaintiffs' cases, but
instead solely addressed the show cause order explaining why the
ghostwriting attorneys should not be held in contempt of court for
134. 1d
135. Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 1-102(A)(4) (1983).





140. 968 F. Supp. 1075 (E.D. Va. 1997).
141. See id at 1078.






their unethical piecemeal representation. 4 6 As in Johnson, the
Laremont-Lopez court reasoned that the undisclosed assistance of an
attorney "places the opposing party at an unfair disadvantage, inter-
feres with the efficient administration of justice, and constitutes a mis-
representation to the [c]ourt."'14 7 Laremont-Lopez thus found the
practice of ghostwriting to be unethical not only because it was a mis-
representation to the court and opposing parties, but also because the
confusion created by the practice results in judicial inefficiency. 148
Laremont-Lopez also demonstrates that ghostwriting scenarios can
sometimes become complicated: some attorneys only ghostwrote
pleadings, while others provided continuing advice, and one actually
appeared in court as attorney of record.' 49
Another federal case that discusses the issue of ghostwriting,
Ricotta v. California,5 ° specifically recognized the different degrees to
which lawyers might assist pro se litigants.' 5 ' Disgruntled by the re-
sult of his recent divorce action in the state courts, the pro se plaintiff
had sued eighteen different defendants, including the county, the local
bar, the judge and opposing attorneys in the divorce case, and the
State of California, alleging that they all conspired to violate his civil
rights. 5 ' Though the plaintiff apparently drafted his complaint on his
own, he received ghostwriting assistance with his response to the de-
fendant's motion to dismiss.'53 The ghostwriting attorney later ex-
plained to the court that she was "performing a personal favor at the
request of Mr. Ricotta.' 54 The court noted that if providing some
limited legal advice to friends and family warranted contempt sanc-
tions, then "virtually every attorney licensed to practice would be eli-
gible for contempt proceedings."' 55 The court found, however, that
the ghostwriting attorney in this case had done much more than
merely provide legal advice.' 56 Instead, she had been responsible for
drafting "seventy-five to one hundred percent of Plaintiff's legal argu-
146. See id. at 1076-77.
147. Id. at 1078.
148. See id.
149. See id. at 1079.
150. 4 F. Supp. 2d 961 (S.D. Cal. 1998).
151. See id. at 986-87.
152. See id. at 967.
153. See id. at 985.
154. Id. The ghostwriting attorney described her participation in the preparation of
the plaintiff's case as follows:
I had, with regard to the motion to dismiss only, done some legal research
and prepared a rough draft a portion [sic] of the memorandum of points and
authorities in opposition to the motion. In so doing I acted in the capacity of
a law clerk only, performing a personal favor at the request of Mr. Ricotta.
At the time I submitted my work to Ricotta I told him it was a rough draft
only, and that I was not willing to edit nor even to review his final product.
Id. at 985.




ments" in Ricotta's response to the motion to dismiss." 7 The court
then came to a similar conclusion as the two decisions previously dis-
cussed: "With such participation the attorney guides the course of liti-
gation while standing in the shadows of the Courthouse door."'- The
court held that such substantial assistance was an unethical misrepre-
sentation on the part of the attorney and the pro se litigant.' 5 9 Never-
theless, the court also refused to find the ghostwriting attorney in
contempt on the ground that the rules of professional conduct and
local court rules do not clearly prohibit ghostwriting. 1' Though the
court ruled that the ghostwriting attorney's conduct was improper, it
acknowledged that ghostwriting was not adequately addressed by eth-
ics rules, and it found the imposition of contempt sanctions unwar-
ranted.'6 ' The court went on to suggest that "local courts and
professional bar associations ... directly address the issue of ghost-
writing and delineate what behavior is and is not appropriate."' 62
Taken together, Johnson, Laremont-Lopez, and Ricotta clearly pro-
hibit the practice of undisclosed ghostwriting as an unethical misrepre-
sentation to the court and opposing parties in the litigation. The
treatment of ghostwriting in Ricotta, however, raises an important is-
sue regarding its supposed impropriety: different pro se litigants
might receive different degrees of legal assistance.'6 3 The question
then becomes, at what point does such assistance become unethical
unless disclosed to the court? The difficulty of drawing a bright line
accounts for some of the discrepancy between the courts' condemna-
tion of ghostwriting and the endorsement of disclosed ghostwriting by
state ethics panels.164
D. Additional Ethical Concerns Regarding Ghostwriting
The last set of ghostwriting issues discussed here does not focus on
whether the practice creates problems for judges, court managers, or
attorneys, but instead focuses on whether ghostwriting assistance ef-
fectively serves clients' legal needs.1 65 For instance, Model Rule 1.1




160. See id at 987-88.
161. See id.
162. Id. at 988.
163. See id. at 986-87.
164. See supra Part II.B-C.
165. As Professor Mary Helen McNeal has observed:
It is true that unregulated unbundling would result in greater numbers of
people securing access to the courts and the legal system. However, it is
critical that we examine the potential costs of that access. 'hey include bad
legal results; clients who pursue strategies that will not achieve the result
that they want; clients who get immersed in litigation and then are without
the resources-financial, intellectual, or emotional-to complete the job;
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client.' 1 66 It defines the requirements of competent representation as
"the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably
necessary for the representation.' 1 67 These general terms provide ex-
tremely limited guidance when applied to an attorney providing ghost-
writing assistance. Two comments to Model Rule 1.1, however, help
to illuminate an interpretation of the rule. Comment [2] notes that
"[p]erhaps the most fundamental legal skill consists of determining
what kind of legal problems a situation may involve,"' 68 while Com-
ment [5] suggests that competence includes "inquiry into and analysis
of the factual and legal elements of the problem." '169 The question
thus becomes exactly how deeply a ghostwriting attorney must investi-
gate her client's factual circumstances and legal needs beyond what
might be required to simply draft an adequate pleading.
It is difficult to determine exactly how the competence require-
ments should apply to ghostwriting attorneys. 170 It has been observed
that "[a] literal reading of Model Rule 1.1 suggests that if the 'repre-
sentation' is the discrete task of drafting [a pleading] only, the compe-
tency requirements apply to that document only."' 7 1 According to
this interpretation, so long as the ghostwritten pleading was ade-
quately tuned to the client's problem, it would be competent. This
interpretation of Model Rule 1.1 in regard to ghostwriting is arguably
unsatisfactory, however, because it might ignore other important un-
derlying legal issues that are important to the client's situation. 172 For
instance, if the competency requirements apply only to the ghostwrit-
ten document itself, then a lawyer drafting an answer for a pro se de-
fendant would be free to disregard the possibility of important
counterclaims. 173 Therefore, an attorney who simply ghostwrites a
pleading as requested by a client, without investigating possible addi-
tional claims, arguments, or other legal remedies, might not meet the
competence requirement of Model Rule 1.1.174
The practice of ghostwriting and the attorney-client relationship
that it engenders also implicate the diligence requirement contained in
Model Rule 1.3.175 The comments to Model Rule 1.3 emphasize the
significant obligations encompassed by diligence: "A lawyer should
and, worst of all, clients who ultimately are unable to resolve the problem
without spending large sums of money on legal services.
McNeal, Elderly Clients, supra note 13, at 333.
166. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.1 (1998).
167. Id.
168. Id. Rule 1.1 cmt. [2].
169. Id. Rule 1.1 cmt. [5].
170. See McNeal, Elderly Clients, supra note 13, at 318-25.
171. Id. at 320.
172. See id.
173. See id. at 320-21.
174. See id. at 320.
175. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.3 (1998) ("A lawyer shall act
with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client.").
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act with commitment and dedication to the interests of the client and
with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf."176 This strong lan-
guage seems to suggest that ghostwriting assistance alone might not
satisfy such stringent obligations to the pro se litigant client, and that
diligent representation would require a more comprehensive ap-
proach to the client's legal circumstance. The comments temper the
diligence obligation, however, by noting that "[a] lawyer has profes-
sional discretion in determining the means by which a matter should
be pursued.' 177
A liberal interpretation of the comments to Model Rule 1.3 seem to
give a ghostwriting attorney wide "latitude in choosing how much rep-
resentation to provide."' 78 But without engaging in an investigation
of the facts underlying the client's legal claim, a ghostwriting attor-
ney's actions might not be consistent with the "commitment and dedi-
cation" required by the Model Rule 1.3.
A more interesting question is whether the diligence provision re-
quires that the ghostwriting attorney carefully evaluate the client's de-
cision to proceed pro se in the first place."s Because a client might
lack the ability to successfully proceed pro se if the legal issues were
complex, ethical diligence may require assistance in preparing for liti-
gation beyond the simple drafting of pleadings."' In fact, diligent
representation arguably requires an attorney to carefully explain to
the client the ramifications of her decision to proceed pro se. 1s Ac-
cording to this analysis, even though the comments to Model Rule 1.3
specifically state that lawyers have discretion to determine the scope
of their representation, a diligent ghostwriting attorney would make
sure that the client fully understands the risks of such limited
representation.8 3
A last ethical concern is whether the agreement between a ghost-
writing attorney and her client to terminate representation once
pleadings are drafted satisfies Model Rule 1.16 concerning attorney
176. Id Rule 1.3 cmt. [1].
177. Id. The comments to Model Rule 1.3 specifically refer to Model Rule 1.2,
which allows a lawyer to agree with a client to limit the scope of representation, id.
Rule 1.2, and Model Rule 1.16 regarding allowed withdrawal from representation, id.
Rule 1.16; see supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
178. McNeal, Elderly Clients, supra note 13, at 321.
179. See id.
180. See id. at 322.
181. See id-
182. See id.
183. This idea is often referred to as "informed consent" to the scope of the repre-
sentation. See Paul R. Tremblay, Toward a Cominunity-Based Ethic for Legal Sen'ices
Practice, 37 UCLA L. Rev. 1101, 1117-18 (1990) [hereinafter Tremblay, Comnmity-
Based Ethic] (suggesting that a strict informed consent paradigm often is unsuitable in




withdrawal.184 Model Rule 1.16(b) states that a lawyer may withdraw
from representing a client only if "withdrawal can be accomplished
without material adverse effect on the interests of the client."' 8 5 It
could be argued that a ghostwriting attorney's termination of repre-
sentation violates this rule because the client would almost certainly
be better served if the attorney actually represented her in court.
Model Rule 1.16, however, does allow withdrawal in certain circum-
stances, despite the material harm resulting to the client. These cir-
cumstances include when "the representation will result in an
unreasonable financial burden on the lawyer" 18 6 or when "other good
cause for withdrawal exists."' 87 Thus, the existence of an attorney-
client relationship alone does not, at least according to the Model
Rules, unequivocally bind the attorney to represent the client. Partic-
ularly in circumstances like ghostwriting, where the client and the as-
sisting attorney have specifically agreed to limit the representation,
good cause for withdrawal exists.188 In fact, none of the ethics opin-
ions that discuss the application of ethics rules regarding withdrawal
suggest that the practice of ghostwriting is a per se violation of the
rule.189
E. Guidelines for Ethical Ghostwriting
The scarcity inherent in present legal services circumstances make
ghostwriting and other limited legal assistance methodologies impor-
tant new legal practice models. 9 ° The ABA's final report on the com-
prehensive legal needs study serves as a reminder of the dramatic
disparity between low and middle-income populations' legal needs
and their ability to access the civil justice system: "[N]early three-
fourths [(71%)] of the [legal] situations in low-income households and
nearly two-thirds [(61%)] in moderate-income households never were
brought to the civil justice system."'' This disparity is likely to con-
tinue to grow, considering the substantial budget cuts suffered by low-
184. See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text.
185. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.16(b) (1998).
186. Id. Rule 1.16(b)(5).
187. Id. Rule 1.16(b)(6).
188. Comment [8] to Model Rule 1.16 specifically authorizes withdrawal "if the
client refuses to abide by the terms of an agreement relating to the representation,
such as an agreement concerning fees or court costs or an agreement limiting the
objectives of the representation." Id. Rule 1.16 cmt. [8].
189. See, e.g., Committee on Prof l Ethics, New York State Bar Ass'n, Opinion 613
(1990) (noting that the attorney-client relationship is contractual in nature and may
be limited by agreement); Professional Conduct Comm., Illinois State Bar Ass'n,
Opinion 849 (1983) (warning that though ghostwriting does not violate ethics rules
regarding withdrawal, a ghostwriting attorney must take steps to fully inform the cli-
ent of the consequences of proceeding pro se).
190. See supra notes 6-13 and accompanying text.
191. Agenda for Access, supra note 26, at 5.
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income legal services providers. 192 These hard facts regarding the lim-
ited ability of all but the wealthy to address their legal problems in the
civil justice system lead the ABA report to encourage the develop-
ment of discrete-task legal service practices as an integral part of its
agenda for increased access. 193 If courts are cognizant of this situation
and respect the fundamental constitutional right of access to civil jus-
tice,1 94 they must not discourage limited legal service practice models
like ghostwriting. Indeed, "the creation of barriers to the procure-
ment of legal advice by those in need and who are unable to pay in the
name of legal ethics ill serves the [legal] profession." '
1. Recommendation: Mandatory Disclosure to Avoid
Unethical Misrepresentation
In light of the deferential treatment afforded pro se pleadings in the
federal courts, the courts are correct that undisclosed ghostwriting
assistance might give pro se litigants who receive such assistance an
unfair advantage in litigation.196 The New York City and State ethics
opinions' conclusion that ghostwriting assistance must be disclosed to
the court upon the filing of the complaint seems like the only viable
solution to this problem.197 If any ghostwriting assistance received by
a pro se litigant is disclosed to the court upon the filing of the plead-
ing, the court can then moderate any possible lenient reading of the
pro se litigant's pleading accordingly to avoid unfair prejudice to op-
posing parties.198 Accordingly, disclosing assistance would limit alle-
gations that the ghostwriting attorney had violated ethics rules by
assisting the pro se litigant in misrepresenting herself to the court.'"
By definition, disclosure is inconsistent wvith the misrepresentation
prohibited by ethics rules.2'0
This recommendation, however, is accompanied by a substantial ca-
veat. The concept underlying pro se leniency, that the presence or
absence of counsel should not determine the legitimacy of a litigant's
claim, remains valid. Once ghostwriting assistance has been disclosed,
courts must be extremely careful to avoid denying the pro se litigant
appropriately lenient treatment as the litigation proceeds.2 °1 If the
ghostwriting attorney only helped draft an initial complaint and the
litigant is now properly proceeding entirely on her own pro se, it
192. See supra notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
193. See Agenda for Access, supra note 26, at 11.
194. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
195. Committee on Prof'l Ethics, New York State Bar Ass'n, Opinion 613 (1990).
196. See supra notes 109-13, 134-37, 147-48 and accompanying text.
197. See supra notes 110-14, 116-18 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 134-37, 147-48 and accompanying text.
199. See supra notes 110-11, 116-17 and accompanying text.
200. See Model Code of Professional Responsibility DR 1-102(A)(4) (1980); Model
Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 8.4(c) (1998).
201. See supra Part II.A.
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would disserve justice if the court subsequently treated the litigant as
though she were fully represented by counsel."° Even if it is inappro-
priate for the court to give a lenient reading to the initial ghostwritten
complaint because it was drafted with the assistance of counsel, the
court should still afford the pro se litigant's future filings traditional
leniency.20 3 Also, the court should still be compelled to provide the
same procedural assistance to the litigant, now proceeding entirely
pro se, that it would have without the disclosure of ghostwriting assist-
ance.204 If the court disregards these suggestions, the limited assist-
ance given by the ghostwriting attorney could actually put the pro se
litigant in a worse position in the litigation than if she had received no
assistance at all. Undoubtedly, this situation would undermine low
and moderate-income populations' access to civil justice.
It is equally important for courts to recognize, as both of the New
York ethics opinions did, 0 5 that not all legal advice given to pro se
litigants rises to the level of ghostwriting. 06 As Ricotta v. Califor-
nia207 emphasized, attorneys often give more limited forms of legal
advice to friends, family, and even clients.20 8 Thus, this disclosure re-
quirement should only apply to situations where attorneys draft com-
plaints for pro se litigants "with the ... knowledge that the work will
be presented in some similar form in a motion before the Court. 20 9
Only if the attorney knows that her ghostwritten work-product will
actually be filed by a pro se litigant should she be required to disclose
her legal assistance. In fact, as the New York City Bar's ethics opinion
properly points out, an attorney must refuse to provide ghostwriting
assistance unless the client specifically commits herself to disclosing
the attorney's assistance to the court upon filing. 0
Finally, attorneys must recognize that if they continue to provide
assistance to an ostensibly pro se litigant throughout the course of the
litigation, then disclosure of drafting assistance alone would be insuffi-
cient to satisfy their obligations to the court.2 ' Otherwise, they would
be involved in a continuing misrepresentation to the court and oppos-
202. See supra Part II.A.
203. See supra Part II.A.
204. See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
205. See Committee on Prof'l and Judicial Ethics, Association of the Bar of the City
of N.Y., Formal Op. 1987-2 (1987); Committee on Prof'l Ethics, New York State Bar
Ass'n, Opinion 613 (1990).
206. See supra notes 112, 151, 155 and accompanying text.
207. 4 F. Supp. 2d 961, 987 (S.D. Cal. 1998).
208. Id.
209. Id.
210. See Committee on Prof'l and Judcial Ethics, Association of the Bar of the City
of New York, Formal Op. 1987-2 (1987).
211. For examples of ghostwriters engaging in such undisclosed continuing repre-
sentation while the litigants purported to be proceeding entirely pro se, see Klein v.
Spear, Leeds & Kellogg, 309 F. Supp. 341 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), and ABA Comm. on Eth-
ics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1414 (1978).
2712 [Vol. 67
GHOSTWRITING
ing parties, and should be required to file an appearance as attorney
of record.212
2. Protecting Clients Interests: The Diagnostic Interview
Courts' and ethics panels' concerns that ghostwriting might consti-
tute an unethical misrepresentation, resulting in unfairness to opposing
parties is relatively easily addressed by requiring mandatory disclo-
sure. No equally simple answer exists, however, for the concern that
ghostwriting might not satisfy ethical standards of competent and dili-
gent representation.1 3 Attorneys offering limited ghostwriting serv-
ices must take adequate precautions to protect clients' interests and to
assure that ghostwriting assistance furthers their legal position rather
than hindering it. Fundamentally, ethical standards such as attorney
diligence and competence must be interpreted according to the recog-
nition that scarcity of legal resources will always mandate difficult
choices regarding their distribution.14 In fact, "[blecause [the compe-
tence rule] envisions only traditional, full service representation, it is
of little assistance in determining how this standard might be applied"
to unbundled legal services.21 5 Indeed, the only reason ghostwriting
might be a valuable model of legal services delivery is because re-
source limitations of either the client or legal services providers make
traditional full-service representation impossible.
Some commentators have suggested that limited legal services can
be provided ethically if attorneys engage in an initial "diagnostic inter-
view" with the prospective client.216 Such an interview would involve
obtaining sufficient information from the prospective client to allow
an accurate identification of her legal problem, an assessment of the
level of assistance required to solve the problem, the identification of
possible problems underlying the immediate legal issue, and the ca-
pacity of the client to participate in solving the problem. 1 7 Thus, in
the ghostwriting context, the assisting attorney must not only gather
enough information to draft a pleading for the client, but must also be
212. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op.
1414 (1978).
213. See supra notes 166-79 and accompanying text.
214. See Tremblay, Connunity-Based Ethic, supra note 183, at 1103 ("Scarcity of
time, of resources, of funds, and of political capital alter significantly the practice ex-
perience of the public lawyer representing private clients."); supra notes 6-13 and
accompanying text.
215. McNeal, One Oar, supra note 31, at 2638.
216. See id.; Millemann et al., supra note 16, at 4.
217. See Millemann et al., supra note 16, at 4. Professor McNeal provides a slightly
different list of essential elements of the diagnostic interview, stating that such an
interview: "(1) defines the nature of the legal problem; (2) determines the relevant
facts to gather; (3) identifies the client's goals; (4) determines the range of services
likely to accomplish the client's goals; and (5) determines the range of assistance ap-




aware of any underlying problems the client may have that could be
prejudiced by the ensuing litigation.218 Also, the ghostwriting attor-
ney would have to carefully evaluate whether ghostwriting assistance
would actually further the client's legal position. 19 If the client has
little ability to effectively pursue her case pro se, or if the intended
forum is not receptive to pro se litigants, ghostwriting might not be a
competent solution to the client's. problem.2 0
If a thorough diagnostic interview precedes the provision of ghost-
writing assistance, most of the central competence and diligence con-
cerns regarding the practice would be satisfied. The ghostwriting
attorney would have conducted a detailed "inquiry into and analysis
of the factual and legal elements of the problem," as required by the
competence rule, Model Rule 1.1.221 Also, the attorney would have
clearly determined what the client's legal problems actually were, and
analyzed any possible negative repercussions that would flow from the
client's proceeding pro se in court with the ghostwritten pleading.2 2
A thorough diagnostic interview would also adequately satisfy the
diligence requirement of Model Rule 1.3.23 The ghostwriting attor-
ney would be acting with "commitment and dedication '224 appropri-
ate to the limited legal services context. Further, the diagnostic
interview would provide an adequate understanding of the client's
legal situation to allow the attorney to make informed choices about
the proper scope of representation in light of resource limitations.22 5
Additionally, a properly conducted diagnostic interview would
guarantee that a client understands the limited nature of the legal
assistance that a ghostwriting attorney is offering to provide. Once
the client understands the limitations and possible consequences of
proceeding pro se in court, she could make an informed decision
about whether to accept the attorney's services. If she chooses to ac-
cept the services, the standards of Model Rule 1.2, dealing with limit-
ing the objectives of a representation, would be satisfied. 2 6 In other
218. See McNeal, Elderly Clients, supra note 13, at 321-22.
219. Such considerations are particularly important if courts refuse to give lenient
readings to the pro se litigant's pleading because it was drafted with the assistance of
counsel. See supra Part II.A.
220. See McNeal, One Oar, supra note 31, at 2639.
221. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.1 cmt. [5] (1998).
222. This would answer the suggestion that "[p]erhaps the most fundamental legal
skill consists of determining what kind of legal problems a situation may involve."
Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.1 cmt. [2]; supra notes 48-54 and accom-
panying text.
223. See Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.3; supra notes 55-60 and ac-
companying text.
224. Model Rules of Professional Conduct Rule 1.3 cmt. [1].
225. Comment [1] to Model Rule 1.3 states: "A lawyer has professional discretion
in determining the means by which a matter should be pursued." Id.
226. Model Rule 1.2 provides: "A lawyer may limit the objectives of the represen-
tation if the client consents after consultation." Id. Rule 1.2(c) (emphasis added).
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words, the interview would allow for informed consent on the part of
the client to the limited scope of ghostvriting assistance.227 Once the
client agrees to accept limited ghostwriting assistance, the attorney
would satisfy competence and diligence requirements provided that
she adequately drafted the agreed-upon pleadings, taking into account
possible problems the client might have as she proceeds in court pro
se.
At minimum, the diagnostic interview should provide the attorney
with enough information about her client's legal circumstances that
the attorney can be reasonably certain that the provision of ghost-
writing assistance will not harm the client. Ideally, "[a] balance should
be struck between a standard so strict that it will discourage lawyers
from providing ghostwriting assistance and one so lenient that it will
potentially harm clients."'  As long as limited legal services models
do not harm clients, any assistance that might further their legal posi-
tion, even in a very limited way, should not be hindered by ethical
rules formulated with traditional full-service representation in mind.
Even if ghostwriting attorneys are able to satisfy their ethical obli-
gations to courts, opposing parties, and clients, there still might be
some procedural impediments to the practice that must be overcome.
Part III analyzes two procedural issues discussed by the district courts
that ghostwriting attorneys must acknowledge: possible violations of
both Rule 11 and local withdrawal rules.
III. PROCEDURAL IssuEs RAISED BY GHOSTrWRITING
The preceding analysis establishes that ghostwriting is an ethically
acceptable practice, so long as such assistance is disclosed to the court
and opposing parties upon the filing of the pleadings by the pro se
client, and so long as the ghostwriting attorney engages in a sufficient
diagnostic interview designed to protect the client's legal interests. A
few district courts, however, have not only condemned ghostwriting as
an unethical misrepresentation," 9 but also as a violation of both the
signature requirement of Rule 1110 and local withdrawal rules requir-
227. Of course, if the client felt she had no alternatives, her consent to limited rep-
resentation would not necessarily be voluntary. Though this circumstance is less than
ideal, it is mandated by the scarcity of legal resources, particularly in the poverty law
context. See Tremblay, Comnmunity-Based Ethic, supra note 183, at 1117-18 (1990)
(suggesting that a strict informed consent paradigm often is unsuitable in poverty law
contexts where lawyers must make representation decisions based on the scarcity of
resources).
228. McNeal, One Oar, supra note 31, at - (+24).
229. See supra Part II.C.
230. See Fed R. Civ. P. 11; Watkins v. Associated Brokers, Inc., No. 98 C 3316, 1998
WL 312124, at *2 n.4 (N.D. IlI. June 5, 1998); Wesley v. Don Stein Buick, Inc., 987 F.
Supp. 884, 887 (D. Kan. 1997); Laremont-Lopez v. Southeastern Tidewater Opportu-
nity Ctr., 968 F. Supp. 1075, 1078 (E.D. Va. 1997); Johnson v. Board of County
Comm'rs, 868 F. Supp. 1226, 1231-32 (D. Colo. 1994).
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ing permission of the court to withdraw from representation. 23' This
part explores the district courts' application of these procedural rules
to the practice of ghostwriting. First, this part specifically analyzes the
applicability of Rule 11 to the practice of ghostwriting and highlights
some problems with the courts' interpretation of the rule. It then ex-
amines the purpose of local procedural rules prohibiting attorney
withdrawal from representation without the permission of the court
and considers their applicability to the ghostwriting scenario.
A. Rule 11
The basic purpose of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure is to deter the filing of pleadings and motions in court that are
not adequately grounded in fact or law.3 2 By deterring such baseless
pleadings, the rule seeks to maximize judicial efficiency and protect
litigants from having to defend themselves in court against unfounded
claims.2 33 Rule 11 serves these ends by requiring that any pleading or
motion paper submitted to a court be based upon the filing party's
belief, formed after a reasonable inquiry, that the paper is not being
presented for an improper purpose, its claims are warranted by ex-
isting law or a nonfrivolous argument for a change in the law, and its
factual allegations or denials have evidentiary support or are likely to
after reasonable discovery.23 4 The rule then provides for sanctions
against any party responsible for violating this certification
requirement. 235
To facilitate an analysis of the federal courts' application of Rule 11
to the practice of ghostwriting, it is worthwhile to briefly outline the
rule's requirements. Rule 11(a) requires that all documents filed with
a court must be signed by at least one attorney of record or, if a party
is unrepresented by counsel, by the filing party herself.236 If a filed
document is unsigned, the rule requires that it be stricken by the
court. 237 Rule 11(b) states that any attorney or party presenting a pa-
231. See Laremont-Lopez, 968 F. Supp. at 1079.
232. See Business Guides, Inc. v. Chromatic Communications Enters. 498 U.S. 533,
542 (1991).
233. See White v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 675, 683 (10th Cir. 1990) ("Rule
11 sanctions are meant to serve several purposes, including (1) deterring future litiga-
tion abuse, (2) punishing present litigation abuse, (3) compensating victims of litiga-
tion abuse, and (4) streamlining court dockets and facilitating case management.").
234. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b).
235. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c).
236. Rule 11(a) reads as follows:
Every pleading, written motion, and other paper shall be signed by at least
one attorney of record in the attorney's individual name, or, if the party is
not represented by an attorney, shall be signed by the party.... An unsigned
paper shall be stricken unless omission of the signature is corrected promptly
after being called to the attention of the attorney or party.




per to the court, "whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advo-
cating," is responsible for the reasonable inquiry to assure that it is
properly grounded in law and fact.13 Finally, Rule 11(c) provides for
the imposition of sanctions on "the attorneys, law firms, or parties"
that have violated the certification requirement of subdivision (b).2 9
Such sanctions can be initiated by a motion made by an opposing
party, which may only be filed with the court if the challenged paper is
not withdrawn within twenty-one days after service of the motion.240
Alternatively, the court, on its own initiative, may order that a party
show cause as to why it should not be sanctioned for a violation of the
rule.241
1. Courts' Application of Rule 11 to Ghostwriting
All of the federal court opinions that specifically address attorney
ghostwriting condemn the practice as a violation of Rule 11.242 The
courts base their conclusion that ghostwriting violates Rule 11 on a
literal reading of the Rule, which requires the person who prepares
any document filed with the court to sign the document. 243 As the
Johnson court stated:
What we fear is that in some cases actual members of the bar ...
prepare briefs for [pro se litigants] which the assisting lawyers do
not sign, and thus escape the obligation ... typified by F.R.Civ.P. 11
... of representing to the court that there is good ground to support
the assertions made.244
238. Rule 11(b) states:
By presenting to the court (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later
advocating) a pleading, written motion, or other paper, an attorney or un-
represented party is certifying that to the best of the person's knowledge,
information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the cir-
cumstances, (1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose ... (2)
the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted by
existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension, modification,
or reversal of existing law ... (3) the allegations and other factual conten-
tions have evidentiary support ....
Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b).
239. Rule 11(c) states: "If, after notice and a reasonable opportunity to respond,
the court determines that subdivision (b) has been violated, the court may ... impose
an appropriate sanction upon the attorneys, law firms, or parties that have violated
subdivision (b) or are responsible for the violation." Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c).
240. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1)(A).
241. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1)(B).
242. See Watkins v. Associated Brokers, Inc., No. 98 C 3316, 1998 WL 312124, at *2
n.4 (N.D. II. June 5, 1998); Ricotta v. California, 4 F. Supp. 2d 961, 986 (S.D. Cal.
1998); Wesley v. Don Stein Buick, Inc., 987 F. Supp. 884, 886 (D. Kan. 1997);
Laremont-Lopez v. Southeastern Tidewater Opportunity Ctr., 968 F. Supp. 1075,
1078-79 (E.D. Va. 1997); Johnson v. Board of County Comm'rs, 868 F. Supp. 1226,
1231-32 (D. Colo. 1994).
243. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(a).
244. Johnson, 868 F. Supp. at 1231-32 (quoting Ellis v. Maine, 448 F.2d 1325, 1328
(1st Cir. 1971)).
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In its brief analysis, however, the court did not address the question of
whether the ghostwritten pleadings failed to meet the legal and factual
standards of Rule 11(b). It simply concluded that the absence of the
drafter's signature was a per se violation of the rule and a deliberate
evasion of its requirements.245
The Eastern District of Virginia offered a more substantial discus-
sion of the applicability of Rule 11 to ghostwriting attorneys. In
Laremont-Lopez v. Southeastern Tidewater Opportunity Center,246 the
attorneys who had drafted pleadings for employment discrimination
plaintiffs argued that "at the time the complaints were filed their rep-
resentation of the plaintiffs had terminated, and thus, it was appropri-
ate for the plaintiffs to sign the pleadings."247 Thus, according to the
arguments of the ghostwriting attorneys, the signature requirement of
Rule 11(a) required only the plaintiff's own signatures because they
were effectively unrepresented parties.248
The court admitted that the ghostwriters' argument was "not at
odds with the plain language of Rule 11," but nonetheless held that
the attorneys' failure to sign the pleadings "undermine[d] the purpose
of the signature ... requirement of the rule. '2 49 Though the court
noted that the amended Rule 11 might allow sanctions to be imposed
against the ghostwriting attorneys despite their failure to sign, it con-
cluded that a court might nevertheless "encounter legal and factual
obstacles" in trying to do so." The court noted that such obstacles
might include the difficulty of determining whether ostensibly pro se
litigants were actually receiving legal assistance from a ghostwriting
attorney, as well as problems ascertaining the attorney's identity and
imposing appropriate sanctions.2  Thus, unlike Johnson, Laremont-
Lopez's application of Rule 11 to ghostwriting attorneys does not fo-
cus solely on the literal signature requirement of the rule. Nonethe-
less, the Laremont-Lopez opinion, like Johnson, concluded that the
practice of ghostwriting itself, regardless of the merits of the docu-
ment, violates Rule 11.12
Unfortunately, courts' concern that the practice of undisclosed
ghostwriting might allow unscrupulous attorneys to help ostensibly
pro se litigants pursue frivolous actions with impunity is not entirely
unfounded. A few federal cases document instances where the courts
suspect that vexatious pro se litigants have received ghostwriting
assistance from attorneys to file frivolous lawsuits, but can neither
confirm that such assistance was received nor identify the attorneys
245. See id.
246. 968 F. Supp. 1075 (E.D. Va. 1997).
247. Id. at 1078.
248. See id.
249. Id. at 1078 (citation omitted).





involved. For example, a court detailed the litigious history of one
persistent pro se plaintiff in Klein v. Spear, Leeds & Kellogg.13
Before filing the action at issue in that case, plaintiff Klein had com-
menced "well over thirty lawsuits against a very large number of de-
fendants," including libel actions against opposing attorneys and
repetitious actions against previously prevailing opponents.2-, From
the tone of the opinion, the court clearly considered Klein a vexatious
litigant pursuing an ever-increasing number of frivolous claims.
Though Klein represented himself as a pro se litigant, an unverified
statement to the court alleged that Klein was receiving the assistance
of an attorney who was ghostwriting his complaints.5 5 The court rec-
ognized that "it is one thing to give some free legal advice," but it
decried the undisclosed ghostwriter's "extensive" undisclosed assist-
ance. 5 6 The court's exasperated diatribe concluded: "[T]his unre-
vealed support in the background enables an attorney to launch an
attack, even against another member of the Bar... without showing
his face." 7 The court did not specifically discuss Rule 11 because the
opinion was written before the 1983 amendments to the rule rescued it
from its previous dormancy." 8
More recently, a court encountered the problem of suspected but
unverifiable ghostwriting assistance for a pro se litigant in Watkins v.
Associated Brokers, Inc.2- 9 Plaintiff Watkins was pursuing allegedly
pro se claims against numerous defendants under myriad legal theo-
ries in a vain attempt to invalidate the foreclosure of her home. r °
Though Watkins was nominally proceeding pro se, "someone familiar
with legal practice and procedure has had a major hand in drafting
[her] Complaint."'2 6 1 The court observed that despite this suspected
legal assistance, "[a] little learning is a dangerous thing. '2 62 The court
summarily concluded that Watkins' attempts to assert federal subject
matter jurisdiction were "sheer frivolousness.126 3 Due to the "blatant
and pervasive violations of Rule 11(b)" contained in the complaint,
the court "demand[ed] that the offending lawyer come forward. '" 2 1
Watkins again illustrates the possibility that an unidentified ghost-
253. 309 F. Supp. 341, 342 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
254. Id
255. See id. ("[Klein's filings] are quite voluminous and by reason of their legal
content and phraseology most strongly suggest that they emanate from a legal
mind.").
256. Id.
257. Id. at 343.
258. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's note (1983).




263. Id. at *2.
264. Id at *2 n.4.
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writer can assist a pro se litigant in advancing frivolous legal positions
while evading the application of Rule 11.265
Ricotta v. California2 66 documents a final instance of a pro se liti-
gant pursuing apparently frivolous claims with the help of an undis-
closed ghostwriting attorney. Plaintiff Ricotta, dissatisfied with the
result of his divorce action in state court, filed a federal suit against
eighteen defendants, including the attorney who represented his wife,
various state judges, the court commissioner, San Diego County, the
state bar, and the State of California.2 67 Ricotta's alleged causes of
action included civil rights violations, RICO violations, and a conspir-
acy to deprive him of his civil rights.268 Unlike the district court opin-
ions in Johnson and Laremont-Lopez, the Ricotta court began its
opinion by carefully addressing all of Ricotta's pleaded causes of ac-
tion against all of the various defendants before dismissing each one
as legally unfounded.269 Noting that several of the defendants had
been forced to defend themselves against Ricotta's legal attacks more
than once,270 the court generously concluded that "the Plaintiff is dan-
gerously close if not an actual vexatious litigant."'2 7 1 In this last in-
stance of his dogged pursuit of the vast judicial conspiracy against him,
Ricotta did not disclose that he had received substantial assistance
from a ghostwriting attorney. The ghostwriting assistance might never
have been discovered if some defendants had not discerned a glaring
stylistic disparity between different parts of his complaint and con-
tacted the suspected ghostwriter.272
These cases illustrate the concerns that motivate courts to identify
undisclosed ghostwriting as violative of the requirements of Rule 11.
They emphasize the abuses that might arise when attorneys offer
ghostwriting assistance without at least some investigation of their pro
se clients' allegations and possible prior history of pro se litigation.
Or, from a more cynical perspective, these cases illustrate unscrupu-
lous attorneys' ability to knowingly assist in the pursuit of frivolous
litigation through the practice of undisclosed ghostwriting without
fear of Rule 11 sanctions.
265. It is interesting to note that the court did not consider levying Rule 11 sanc-
tions against Watkins herself, despite the fact that she presumably signed the frivolous
complaint.
266. 4 F. Supp. 2d 961 (S.D. Cal. 1998).
267. See id. at 967-77.
268. See id. at 967.
269. See id. at 972-82.
270. See id. at 982.
271. Id.
272. See id. at 985.
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2. Recommendations for a Proper Application of Rule 11
to Ghostwriting
According to the application of Rule l's signature requirement of-
fered by the Johnson and Laremont-Lopez courts,27 only the person
who actually signs the pleading or paper certifies that it is not being
filed for any improper purpose and that the legal and factual conten-
tions are warranted by a reasonable inquiry as required by part (b) of
the rule.2 74 This view also assumes that sanctions levied against viola-
tors of the rule, provided for by part (c),275 could only apply to those
who actually affix their signature to the offending document. Accord-
ing to this interpretation, ghostwriting attorneys who do not sign any
pleadings drafted for pro se litigants would effectively be free to disre-
gard the requirements of Rule 11 entirely. Ghostwriting attorneys
would thus not be forced to conduct the "inquiry reasonable under the
circumstances" mandated by Rule 11(b) 276 and would not be subject
to sanctions.
This interpretation of Rule 11, which emphasizes the signing of the
pleading as the action that engenders all of the duties created by the
rule, is consistent with the Supreme Court's pre-1993 reading of Rule
11 in Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group.2 In Pavelic,
the Court, in giving Rule 11 its "plain meaning," held that only attor-
neys or parties who actually sign a pleading could be held liable for
sanctions levied against that pleading under Rule 11.278 Thus, sanc-
tions awarded against the plaintiff's attorney's law firm were im-
proper, and only the signing attorney himself could be held
responsible under the rule.279
The 1993 amendments to Rule 11, however, expressly overruled
Pavelic. The text of the previous version of Rule 11 specifically man-
dated that the signer of the document was responsible for the reason-
able inquiry into the factual veracity and legal legitimacy of the
arguments therein.' 0 The 1993 amendments, however, abolished the
absolute connection between the drafter's signature and her liability
for fulfilling the rule's requirements. Instead, the new rule states that
the court may "impose an appropriate sanction upon the attorneys,
law firms, or parties that have violated subdivision (b) or are responsi-
273. See supra Part III.A.1.
274. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b).
275. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c).
276. See id
277. 493 U.S. 120, 123-24 (1989).
278. See id. at 125-26.
279. See id.
280. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(a) (1983) (amended 1993) ("The signature of an attor-
ney or party constitutes a certificate by the signer... that to the best of the signer's
knowledge, information, and belief formed after reasonable inquiry it is well
grounded in fact and is warranted by existing law ....").
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ble for the violation."'2' 1 The advisory committee's notes to the 1993
amendments to Rule 11 emphasize this change, noting that it allows
the court to sanction any parties "responsible" for the violative docu-
ment, not necessarily the person who actually signed it.282 The advi-
sory committee's notes to the rule specifically state that the court can
make an "additional inquiry" in order to determine who should be
sanctioned for a particular violation of Rule 11.283
In light of this analysis of the 1993 amendments to Rule 11, John-
son's application of the rule to a ghostwriting attorney for simply fail-
ing to sign the pleading is misplaced.2 4 Under the amended version
of Rule 11, the ghostwriting attorney's failure to sign the pleading that
she had drafted for the defendant sheriff2 85 did not immunize her from
sanctions as the court contended.286 Just as the advisory committee
suggested, the court had determined the identity of the ghostwriting
attorney responsible for the pleading and could have levied Rule 11
sanctions against her.
Requiring a pro se litigant to disclose an attorney's assistance in
drafting pleadings when they are filed not only responds to courts'
accusations that ghostwriting is unfair and disingenuous,2 87 but also
placates concern that the practice allows attorneys to evade the certifi-
cation requirements of Rule 11.288 First, the ghostwriting attorney
would be disclosing the fact that she was involved in the drafting of
the pleading. Under the 1993 amendments to Rule 11, which allow
the court to levy sanctions against any party who is responsible for a
violation of the rule (not solely the party who signs the document), 89
this disclosure would notify the court of the attorney's possible re-
sponsibility for any substantive violations. The ghostwriting attorney
281. Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c) (emphasis added). Subdivision (b) also disconnects the
signature requirement from the requirement of reasonable inquiry by using the words
"[bly presenting to the court (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocat-
ing) a pleading" to describe the individuals responsible for the reasonable investiga-
tion instead of using the word "signer" as the 1983 version of the rule did. Fed. R. Civ.
P. 11(b).
282. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's notes (1993).
283. See id. ("When appropriate, the court can make an additional inquiry in order
to determine whether the sanction should be imposed on such persons, firms, or par-
ties either in addition to or, in unusual circumstances, instead of the person actually
making the presentation to the court.").
284. See Johnson v. Board of County Comm'rs, 868 F. Supp. 1226, 1231-32 (D.
Colo. 1994). The suggestion that a ghostwriting attorney would be required to enter a
formal appearance as attorney of record in order to satisfy Rule 11 is also incorrect
according to this analysis of the 1993 amendments. See Wesley v. Don Stein Buick,
Inc., 987 F. Supp. 884, 887 (D. Kan. 1997) (suggesting that failure to enter an appear-
ance as attorney of record results in evasion of Rule 11 requirements).
285. See Johnson, 868 F. Supp. at 1228.
286. See id. at 1231-32.
287. For a discussion of why ethical concerns require disclosure of ghostwriting
assistance to the court, see supra Part II.E.1.
288. See supra notes 244-45, 249-50 and accompanying text.
289. See supra notes 249-51 and accompanying text.
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would thus be subject to sanctions under Rule 11(c) and could not be
accused of evading the rule's requirements.290 Second, disclosing the
ghostwriting attorney's identity would minimize the efficiency con-
cerns expressed in Laremont-Lopez. 91 If a ghostwriting attorney's
identity were disclosed, along with her involvement in the drafting of
the pleading, the court would not be forced to conduct any satellite
inquiry into these questions.
Even if disclosure of a ghostwriting attorney's identity were
mandatory, however, she should only be held responsible for viola-
tions of Rule 11 in the most egregious circumstances. Several aspects
of the rule itself and its interpretation by courts support this conclu-
sion. First, Rule 11(b) requires the party responsible for a complaint
to conduct only "an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances" to
ascertain the factual correctness and legal validity of a pleading or
other court document.2 92 Because a ghostwriting attorney generally
engages in such a limited representation due to severe constraints on
time and resources, 293 the reasonableness of her inquiry into her cli-
ent's allegations should be judged accordingly. Courts have specifi-
cally held that the standard of a reasonable inquiry under Rule 11
depends on the time and resources available to an attorney under the
circumstances.294 Thus, only a limited investigation of the client's alle-
gations by a ghostwriting attorney would be "reasonable under the
circumstances." The courts should only consider Rule 11 sanctions
against a ghostwriting attorney if it were obvious to the attorney that
the client's allegations were false.29 5
Second, courts should be reluctant to levy Rule 11 sanctions against
a ghostwriting attorney because the attorney no longer has responsi-
bility for the litigation of that pleading when it is actually filed. The
litigant, now proceeding pro se, makes the decision about whether a
potentially frivolous claim should be withdrawn under the "safe har-
bor" notice provision of the amended Rule 11;296 therefore, she
290. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c).
291. See Laremont-Lopez v. Southeastern Tidewater Opportunity Ctr., 968 F.
Supp. 1075, 1079 (E.D. Va. 1997) ("[T]he additional inquiry necessitated by the law-
yers' failure to sign the pleadings interferes with the 'just, speedy, and inexpensive
determination' of those actions."); supra notes 249-51 and accompanying text.
292. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b).
293. See supra notes 33-40 and accompanying text.
294. See, eg., Blue v. United States Dep't of the Army, 914 F.2d 525, 546 (4th Cir.
1990) (recognizing that the reasonableness of a Rule 11 inquiry depends on the cir-
cumstances of the representation); Szabo Food Serv., Inc. v. Canteen Corp., 823 F.2d
1073, 1083 (7th Cir. 1987) ("The amount of investigation required by Rule 11 depends
... on the time available to investigate ... the Rule does not require steps that are not
cost-justified.").
295. Examples might be instances where an attorney knew that the client had filed
similar previous claims and lost. See supra notes 253-57 and accompanying text.
296. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(1)(A) ("A motion for sanctions ... shall not be filed
with.., the court unless, within 21 days after service of the motion... the challenged
paper... is not withdrawn or appropriately corrected.").
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should also be responsible for possible sanctions. Because the ghost-
writing attorney has no control over the future withdrawal of the
pleading that she drafted, she should only be liable for Rule 11 sanc-
tion in circumstances where it was unquestionably clear that the
pleading itself was frivolous. The attorney does have an ethical duty,
however, to make sure the client understands her potential liability for
continued support of a frivolous contention.29
This analysis is not intended to suggest that courts should not take
the litigant's pro se status into account when considering levying sanc-
tions against her. Courts generally accord pro se litigants more leni-
ent treatment under Rule 11 than parties represented by counsel.298
The Advisory Committee's notes to the 1993 amendments to Rule 11
also state that a court should consider a litigant's legally untrained
status when considering Rule 11 sanctions.299 Fundamentally, the
courts should have particularly good reasons to even consider Rule 11
sanctions against either a ghostwriting attorney or her pro se litigant
client.3 0
B. Application of Local Withdrawal Rules to Ghostwriting
Most federal district courts have local rules of procedure that re-
quire an attorney of record representing a client in a case before the
court to obtain the court's permission before withdrawing from her
representation of that client.30 ' Though these local withdrawal rules
do not always contain identical language,302 they all require that an
attorney must obtain the leave of the court to withdraw from a repre-
sentation once she has appeared on behalf of a client in that court.
These local rules are procedural and should be distinguished from eth-
ical rules concerning attorney withdrawal discussed earlier.30 3
297. See supra Part II.E.2.
298. See Warren v. Guelker, 29 F.3d 1386, 1390 (9th Cir. 1994); Vukadinovich v.
McCarthy, 901 F.2d 1439, 1445 (7th Cir. 1990); Elmore v. McCammon, 640 F. Supp.
905, 910 (S.D. Tex. 1986).
299. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 advisory committee's notes (1993) ("[W]hether the re-
sponsible person is trained in the law . . . may in a particular case be [a] proper
consideration[ ].").
300. For a discussion of such egregious instances of ghostwriting abuse, see supra
notes 253-72 and accompanying text.
301. See, e.g., E.D. Pa. Local R. 5.1(c) ("An attorney's appearance may not be
withdrawn except by leave of court, unless another attorney of this Court shall at the
same time enter an appearance for the same party."); E.D. Va. Local R. 83.1(G) ("No
attorney who has entered an appearance in any civil or criminal action shall withdraw
such appearance, or have it stricken from the record, except on order of the Court
and after reasonable notice to the party on whose behalf said attorney has
appeared.").
302. See supra note 301.
303. See Rusinow v. Kamara, 920 F. Supp. 69, 70-71 (D.N.J. 1996) (noting that local
withdrawal rule requiring the permission of the court to withdraw from a representa-
tion and ethical withdrawal rules protecting clients are distinct attorney obligations).
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1. One Court's Application of Local Withdrawal Rules to
Prohibit Ghostwriting
In Laremont-Lopez v. Southeastern Tidewater Opportunity
Center,3" the court held that a group of attorneys who had ghostwrit-
ten complaints for several different employment discrimination plain-
tiffs had violated Local Rule 83.1(G), the withdrawal rule for that
court.30 5 Though the court admitted that the ghostwriting attorneys
did not enter a formal appearance as counsel of record, it found that
because the attorneys contracted "to provide representation directly
related to the litigation of these cases," they represented the plaintiffs
substantially enough to incur the obligations of the Rule. 3°6 Thus, ac-
cording to the court, the attorneys' termination of their representation
of the plaintiffs without the permission of the court violated the rule
even though they never formally appeared as counsel of record and
the ghostwritten pleadings were filed pro se.317 Indeed, the attorneys'
representation of the litigants terminated before any pleadings were
ever filed with the court.308
At first glance, the Laremont-Lopez court's logic seems counterin-
tuitive. How could the ghostwriting attorneys have failed to obtain
permission to withdraw from a legal representation that had already
ended before the litigation ever began, before the court was ever in-
volved in the case? In simpler terms, how is it possible for one to
disappear without permission if one never appeared in the first place?
To answer these questions, it is necessary to pinpoint the moment in
the course of an attorney-client relationship at which local withdrawal
rules like 83.1(G) take effect. One must determine exactly what act
engages this obligation of an attorney to notify her client and obtain
the court's permission to withdraw from the representation. If the
practice of ghostwriting itself constitutes an appearance as attorney of
record simply because it engenders an attorney-client relationship, it
would be rendered impossible by definition. An attorney could never
agree to provide only drafting assistance and preliminary advice be-
cause she could always be forced to appear in court and fully repre-
sent the pro se litigant as counsel of record.
Before closely considering the language of the rule and the nature
of the appearance whose unauthorized termination it prevents, it is
useful to keep in mind the Laremont-Lopez court's explanation of the
purposes that these withdrawal rules are intended to fulfill. Accord-
304. 968 F. Supp. 1075 (E.D. Va. 1997). This case has been discussed previously in
regard to both unfairness and Rule 11 issues. See supra notes 140.49, 246-52 and ac-
companying text.
305. Id. at 1079-80.
306. The court also noted that some of the attorneys received monetary compensa-





ing to the court, the basic purpose of the rule is to "ensur[e] that the
court is able to fairly and efficiently administer" justice.30 9 Because
the court suffered substantial confusion in trying to determine if the
pro se plaintiffs were represented in these cases, and if so by whom,
the court decided that this efficiency rationale behind the rule had
been thwarted.310 Therefore, according to the court, "[t]he Local
Rule is intended to eliminate this confusion and ensure that the ap-
propriate litigants and attorneys receive proper notice of all
proceedings."'311
2. An Analysis of Local Withdrawal Rules and Their
Inapplicability to Ghostwriting
Local Rule 83.1(G), invoked by the Laremont-Lopez court, pro-
vides that "[n]o attorney who has entered an appearance in any civil
or criminal action shall withdraw such appearance, or have it stricken
from the record, except on order of the Court and after reasonable
notice to the party on whose behalf said attorney has appeared. '312
To determine whether the court applied the rule to the ghostwriting
attorneys correctly, the fundamental inquiry is whether an attorney's
provision of assistance in preparing pleadings, without further repre-
sentation, constitutes the entering of an "appearance." The term "ap-
pearance," as applied to attorneys, is not defined anywhere in the
Local Rules for the Eastern District of Virginia, nor is it defined in the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure as applied to attorneys.3 13 The same
district's Local Rule 83.1(F), however, does provide that "[a]ny coun-
sel presenting papers, suits, or pleadings for filing, or making an ap-
pearance, must be members of the bar of this court."314 This language
implies that presenting papers and making an appearance are distinct
actions. Confusingly, however, the same rule also provides that "Any
counsel who joins in a pleading, motion, or other paper filed with the
Court will be held accountable for the case by the Court. ' 315 Thus,
this section contributes to the perplexity, rather than clarifying the is-
309. Id. (citing Olintrup v. Firearms Ctr., Inc., 802 F.2d 676 (3d Cir. 1986)).
310. See id. at 1079. This conclusion, however, is somewhat fact-specific. The attor-
neys here did not all specifically agree only to ghostwrite the plaintiffs pleadings. In-
stead, some of them provided only drafting assistance, some provided advice about
the litigation itself, and one actually entered a formal appearance and represented the
plaintiff in court. See id. Thus, in a ghostwriting scenario in which an attorney clearly
agreed only to draft the pleadings and disclosed this arrangement to the court, the
efficiency problem might not arise.
311. Id.
312. E.D. Va. Local R. 83.1(G).
313. Even Professors Wright and Miller, in their authoritative treatise on civil pro-
cedure, only discuss the term "appearance" as it relates to litigants themselves for
jurisdictional purposes, not as it applies to the attorneys who represent such litigants.
See 5A Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure
§ 1344 (2d ed. 1990).




sue, by introducing the ambiguous terms "joins" and "held accounta-
ble" into the interpretive milieu.
Though the Virginia rules themselves provide little guidance in de-
fining an "appearance" for the purposes of Local Rule 83.1(G), it
might be possible to discern its meaning by reference to similar rules
for other district courts. A similar rule for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, Local Rule 5.1(c), provides that "[an attorney's ap-
pearance may not be withdrawn except by leave of the court, unless
another attorney of this Court shall at the same time enter an appear-
ance for the same party.1316 Though this language in itself provides
no additional guidance, it is preceded by Local Rule 5.1(a), which pro-
vides that "[t]he filing of a pleading, motion or stipulation shall be
deemed an entry of appearance.1317 According to this definition of
"appearance," the act of filing the pleading, not the act of writing it,
nor the formation of an attorney-client relationship, would engage the
relationship between the litigant and the court and thus invoke the
obligations of the local withdrawal rules. This definition seems to ex-
clude an attorney who solely provided ghostwriting assistance with a
pleading which her client filed pro se. Instead, it would be the pro se
litigant herself who is making an "appearance" in court, not the ghost-
writing attorney whose relationship to the case has already been ter-
minated. The fact that the Laremont-Lopez court interpreted
"appearance" differently than it is defined by the rules of other courts
does not itself, of course, make the court's interpretation erroneous.
This inconsistency, however, supports an argument that the Virginia
court's interpretation of the withdrawal rule is inconsistent with the
plain meaning of "appearance," which seems to be closer to the defi-
nition provided by the Pennsylvania rule.
Textual analyses aside, it is still necessary to consider whether the
Laremont-Lopez court's interpretation of Local Rule 83.1(G) better
serves the rule's intended purpose. The court identified the funda-
mental purpose of the rule as the avoidance of confusion and ineffi-
ciency which wastes the court's time and resources.318 The court
argued that the confusion engendered by the uncertainty of the status
of the pro se plaintiffs' legal representation undermined its ability to
fairly and efficiently administer the case.319 This interpretation of the
316. E.D. Pa. Local R. 5.1(c).
317. E.D. Pa. Local R. 5.1(a).
318. See supra note 309 and accompanying text. It is important to note that Local
Rule 83.1(G) requires clear communication to the represented party, not only the
court, about the status of legal representation and possible withdrawal. See E.D. Va.
Local R. 83.1(G). Most instances of ghostwriting, however, would not violate this
section of the rule because the pro se litigant would obviously be aware that she is
proceeding with the litigation on her own. Issues of required communication between
the ghostwriting attorney and the pro se litigant client are addressed in some detail at
supra Part II.E.2.
319. See Laremont-Lopez v. Southeastern Tidewater Opportunity Ctr., 968 F.
Supp. 1075, 1079 (1997).
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rule as facilitating clarity of communication regarding the status of
litigants' legal representation and the identity of such counsel is con-
sistent with other caselaw examining the invocation of such local with-
drawal rules.32° Outside of the specific factual circumstances of the
ghostwriting representation in Laremont-Lopez,32 ' however, in cases
where the ghostwriter-client relationship has clearly ended, the prac-
tice of ghostwriting would not generate such an inordinate amount of
confusion for the court. Particularly if the ghostwriting assistance
were disclosed to the court upon the filing of the ghostwritten plead-
ings, such confusion would be avoided. 322
Because disclosure of ghostwriting largely addresses Laremont-Lo-
pez's efficiency concerns, it should not violate local withdrawal rules.
The basic notice function of the rules will have been satisfied. Also,
because ghostwriting attorneys by definition do not generally file a
formal appearance in court, they should not be subject to the local
withdrawal rules which only require permission of the court to with-
draw once such an appearance has been made. Even if the courts
insist on making the strained argument that the drafting of pleadings
is a functional appearance before the court, they should refrain from
applying the local withdrawal rules as a matter of policy. If courts
recognize that ghostwriting can be an ethically acceptable means to
increase access to civil justice, a constitutional right,32 3 they should not
apply these local procedural rules so as to inhibit the practice.
CONCLUSION
The practical effects of the increasing practice of unbundled legal
services will continue to be analyzed as such practices are imple-
mented and new models are developed. Already, however, such mod-
els are providing more legal assistance to more people, incrementally
increasing access to civil justice. Courts and bar associations should
make every effort to avoid stiffing the development of these new mod-
els of legal practice through applications of ethical and procedural
norms that were designed with full-service, traditional representation
in mind. If the legal community takes the right of access to civil jus-
tice seriously, new experiments that increase access to legal advice and
representation should be encouraged.
320. See Ohntrup v. Firearms Ctr., Inc., 802 F.2d 676, 679 (3d Cir. 1986) ("[T]he
purposes of Local Rule 18(c) include providing for communications between the liti-
gants and the court, as well as ensuring effective court administration."); Wolgin v.
Smith, Civ. A. 94-7471, 1996 WL 482943, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 21, 1996) (citing Ohn-
trup as well as mentioning other factors including prejudice to the litigants).
321. See supra note 310.
322. For a discussion of the implications of full disclosure of ghostwriting assist-
ance, see supra Part II.E.1.
323. See supra notes 2-3 and accompanying text.
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As one small piece of this process, ghostwriting in particular should
not be prohibited through overly literal interpretations of ethical or
procedural rules. So long as ghostwriting assistance is disclosed to the
court and opposing parties, the majority of courts' ethical and proce-
dural concerns will be assuaged. Though ghostwriting is an entirely
ethical practice, however, attorneys must vigilantly assure that such
limited legal assistance does not denigrate the interests of their clients.
Notes & Observations
